Europe as a Security Actor and CSDP

Whither Humanitarian Intervention?

The Implications of Gender on International Migration

The social realities behind the discourse of “Radicalisation”

Book Review: When Trees Fall, Monkeys Scatter: Rethinking Democracy in China
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Dear Reader,

Horizon Insight’s new issue at hand features four articles focusing on security challenges to Europe and the globe and a book review reflecting those to democracy. To be more precise:

“Europe as a Security Actor and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)” is an effort to revisit the debate from both sides of the Atlantic, mainly between those who think strengthening CSDP would enfeeble NATO and those deem NATO must be weakened to strengthen CSDP. For the former, the author posits robust CSDP anchored in NATO would make the Alliance much stronger and better equipped to face the new challenges. For the second group, he shows the potential risk of only achieving an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world in terms of security. He offers both sides to view CSDP complementary to NATO and work towards it.

“Whither Humanitarian Intervention?” tackles the question: “Is it almost impossible for international community to be consistent when applying the rule of law in humanitarian intervention in the international system?” The authors argue nations pursue realist foreign policies and that unilateral and even multilateral intervention decisions are based on national interests rather than humanitarian considerations. The study well reflects evolution of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and its variants to give an insight about the trajectory of the issue.

“The Implications of Gender on International Migration” provides a critical review of the literature of gender in international migration studies. After presenting and analyzing the role of gender in general concepts/drivers of global migration, the author focuses on how gender shapes the major causes of global migration and the connections of gender with international migration.

“The social realities behind the discourse of ‘Radicalization’” is an attempt to take a look from above over those different tailored programs to find answer to the question of “What is radicalisation?” Interestingly, although forming a departure point for any effort to counter this phenomenon, extant examples exhibit ambiguity on its definition. The author shows the ill-defined term does not merit to attain a commonly accepted definition by the academics and policymakers either.

Last, “Book Review: ‘When Trees Fall, Monkeys Scatter: Rethinking Democracy in China’” is an attempt to contribute to understanding of a depressing issue of our times, the emergence of new types of regimes. The book by John Keane, renowned for his imaginative thinking about democracy and its future, shows how new democratic appearing regimes become stage to sizable efforts to undermine the very fundamental tenets of democracy, using the example of China.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG
Europe as a Security Actor and 
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

M. Mukerrem Ari *

The subject of security has been at the heart of the study of international relations especially for the past half century. It has been to some extent pivotal to the way the scholars of international relations have thought about the core purpose of discipline and the location of its boundaries. For many students of international relations, it is the security aspect that makes the study worthwhile. As Karl Deutsch stated, the study of international analysis is “the art and science of the survival of mankind.”

The concept of security has been traditionally concerned more with states than people. Despite the prevalence of the state-based approaches to security during the Cold War, alternative ways of thinking about security also developed. However, during the Cold War, the military dimension dominated all the other dimensions of security. However, in the post-Cold War era the primacy of the state as referent object in consideration of security has become under increasing challenges from a variety of perspectives. One of the key themes to emerge from the post-Cold War debate on the nature of security has been the need to go beyond traditional understandings of security.

In today’s world, the effort to redefine security stems not just from a changing world but also from changes in the state itself. These changes, having primarily to do with the global economic system, affect material conditions within states - safety, welfare, sovereignty - in ways that serve to undermine the traditional roles of government. These transformative forces also affect the capabilities of states, by creating contradictions between the accustomed practices of governments and the responses needed to buffer against those forces.

From the European security environment perspective, the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have provided striking confirmation of European weaknesses and dependency on US. Without entering into its details, the conflict clearly demonstrated that Europe’s influence and responsibility will continue to be limited in the absence of substantial effort to improve its military capabilities. In that respect, the European Security Defense Identity was an initiative designed to give the EU an independent voice with respect to security issues, including independent means in responding to these issues. By its very nature it is intended to shift the European/Americas balance within the NATO alliance, instilling greater influence on the European side.

1. Introduction: New Security Challenges

The 1990s witnessed intense institutional maneuvering by Western governments eager to influence the contours of the so-called European security architecture. In the immediate wake of the revolutionary changes of 1989, Western Europe and the United States worked feverishly to ensure the continuation of existing multilateral security institutions. As Robert J. Art has explained, Western governments feared that a weakening of these institutions would

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lead to an upsurge in nationalism and ultimately the re-nationalization of defense and security. In short, Western European governments continued to regard security as indivisible and consequently felt compelled to cooperate in order to achieve national security (Art, 1996).

Determined efforts were thus made to consolidate international cooperation in the European Union and NATO. Notwithstanding the important achievements in terms of developing a common European security framework, the United States and her Atlanticist allies in Europe have managed to retain NATO as the central military security organization in Europe. This process of institutional positioning was accompanied by attempts to formulate new strategic doctrines and defense policies for the Western allies. However, the rapidly changing security environment that characterized the 1990s was hardly conducive to the formulation of long-term security policies and strategies. There was broad agreement that the existing force structures, geared as they were to a massive conventional war with the Warsaw Pact, were rapidly becoming obsolete (Art, 1996).

It was more difficult to agree on a suitable replacement, and after a decade of efforts to reform, only a handful of countries seem to have achieved anything resembling a comprehensive defense reform. In the absence of a political consensus on the goals and objectives of security cooperation, it is difficult to launch an effective and targeted defense reform. There is strong agreement on the desirability of sustaining the existing cooperative frameworks, but a large part of the motivation would seem to be negative rather than positive.

The Western community is facing a new range of threats and risks, which necessitates the development of new approaches to international security and the formulation of new security strategies. However, it is difficult to agree on the exact nature of these threats and how best to counter them. Notwithstanding the indivisibility of security, the distance between Washington D.C. and Brussels seems to have grown considerably within the past decades, and it is increasingly acknowledged that the Europeans need to develop their own platform for security and defense policy. It is this recognition which has led to the development of a security strategy to help guide the future workings of the CSDP (European Security Strategy, ESS, 2003).

Ironically, the passing of the Cold War has in fact made the use of military force much more probable. The rigidity of the former bipolar system has been replaced by a much more fluid and indeterminate international distribution of power. Limited wars and armed conflicts that were near-unthinkable during the Cold War have materialized, prompting a re-evaluation of security thinking, policy and strategy. An efficient military capacity is becoming increasingly important for overall foreign policy and diplomacy. In the words of NATO Ex-Secretary-General Lord Robertson:

“The days of planning for massive armored clashes in the Fulda Gap are behind us. Today, we need forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in the theater for as long as it takes to get the job done: this means that today military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theater” (Robertson, 2002, p.56).
At a time when the need for the projection of international military force seems to become ever more apparent, most European states have sought to cash in on the so-called “peace dividend”. A common short-term solution to this dilemma has been the development of dual defense structures: traditional armed forces trained and equipped for territorial defense within the NATO framework have been supplemented with international rapid reaction forces that can operate under different lines of national and international authority. Some of the savings realized through massive force reductions in terms of territorial defense have thus been redirected towards more modern, internationally deployable forces. The European trend is thus towards reduced territorial mass armies co-existing with smaller international units.

Developing common European responses to current security and defense challenges is a tremendous political undertaking. The issues involved are politically contentious, and it will be difficult to reach a consensus on the form and substance of a common security and defense policy. As Marc Otte stresses, “two kinds of gaps have to be filled: the first is a transatlantic one (i.e. the widening capability gap); the other is a gap among Europeans themselves (i.e. the strategic policy gap)” (Otte, 2002, p.52). Developing a common political vision of the EU as security actor and mobilizing the resources required to implement this vision are the most formidable political challenges facing the European Union today.

2. Theoretical Outlook

An interested observer examining the EU’s CFSP comes across with the interesting puzzles. Perhaps, as Michael Smith points out, the most important questions are the most general ones: Why should a regional economic organization struggle for so long to develop its own foreign policy? Another set of puzzles related with the impact made by EU foreign policy on non-members, and the effects of external forces on the EU as an international actor. If we look at the origin of the CFSP, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was not created to help Europe solve international problems; it was created to prevent and manage international problems from disrupting the Community and, to a certain degree, to make sure a common European voice was heard in international affairs. EPC has changed from a defensive or passive approach to cooperation, from negative to positive integration in the course of time (Smith, 2004).

This cooperation is theoretically and empirically interesting for some reasons. First, EU foreign policy is largely aspirational and secondly, this cooperation was achieved with an innovative and flexible set of institutional procedures, one that is still expanding. Lastly, how and why the states with vastly various capabilities, through EU, follow such symbolic or aspirational goals by pooling their sovereignty with new institutional mechanism (Smith, 2004).

Indeed, it is fair to say that the mutual links between the inclination of states to cooperate to achieve joint goals, gains and institutional development is dynamic and circular. That is to say; cooperation can inspire and encourage actor to build institutions and in return, institutions themselves help foster cooperative outcomes. Thus, causality runs in both direction, and institutionalization and cooperation affect each other in in a bi-directional manner (Smith, 2004).

On the other hand, mono-causal theories, such as realism, neorealism, to EU foreign
policy are extremely problematic. For example, realism emphasizes the centrality of structural anarchy and power politics in the international system. Security is to be gained through power politics and states can most effectively find security through alliances and the effective operation of the balance of power. But cooperation in the EC/EU has taken place during bipolarity (Cold War) and unipolarity. In other words, there has been no systematic relationship between policies of the superpowers and the response of the EU. A single international framework can hardly explain the wide variety of outcomes in world politics. Realist theories perceiving external threats as a motivating factor for cooperation are not very useful for understanding EU foreign policy (Smith, 2004).

In particular liberal institutionalists stressed the potential for international cooperation, especially through multilateralism, interdependence and institutional integration which confront the abovementioned limitations of realist theory. Interdependence theories suggest that states are more likely to cooperate the cost and benefit of the arisen issues, as security concerns lessen among a set of states, and as issues become increasingly entangled with each other.

According to Smith, European foreign policy cooperation and integration in general can be explained by two causal logics. First the regional integration logic, which involves situations where outside actors make demands on the EU as a result of its efforts to create common polices, primarily in terms of completing the single European market. The second, interdependence logic, imply that international pressures can stimulate a collective response by the EU. The latter became especially relevant after 1972, when political and economic upheavals involving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil crises challenged the EC to find a common external policy (Smith, 2004).

One of the leading figures in early integration studies, Ernst Haas, defined integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states” (Haas, 1958). The early integration theories were quite optimistic in assuming that the process of integration would be linear and self-reinforcing due to spill-over effect. The latter concept was defined by Charles Lindberg as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth” (Lindberg, 1963, p.10). Integration in one field naturally leads to integration in others, and as the capacity and authority of the new center grows, still more citizens will shift their “loyalties, expectations, and political activities” towards the new center. The creation of a customs union between the members of the European Community thus necessitated the development of a common commercial policy. Likewise, the creation of an internal market necessitated the development of a common agricultural policy to replace the divergent and discriminatory national policies.

The optimism of the early integration theories made them an easy target for criticism when the integration process ground to a halt because of political differences between the member states. Integration theory fell
in disrepute, and more traditional, state-centric intergovernmentalism invaded the field of study. One of the early traditionalist critics, Stanley Hoffmann, suggested that a division of labor might be called for, leaving supranationalists to toy around with the low politics of economic integration, while the field of high politics would remain the exclusive domain of intergovernmentalists (Hoffmann, 1965). National governments might be enticed to pool their sovereignty in policy fields that do not threaten the very core of their national authority, but they would certainly reject the idea of granting other states a say in questions of their own "national security". In matters of life and death, risk-averse governments prefer to keep a tight rein (Mouritzen, 1998).

Notwithstanding the richness of the theoretical debates in this field, it is fair to say that most explanatory frameworks emphasize the interests and actions of the member states. No one will deny that the political interests and policies of the member states are a necessary, if not sufficient, explanatory variable in explaining European efforts in the field of security and defense policy. In order to understand the potentials and limits of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), therefore, it is necessary to understand the political forces at work in the current European landscape.

EU security and defense is more a matter of traditional intergovernmental negotiations than formal negotiations and treaty provisions. The United States still has a key role in the development of the CSDP. The Saint-Malo initiative of December 1998, which led to the development of the ESDP, was based on the experience of European military impotence when faced with the war in the Balkans, not misgivings about the Amsterdam Treaty, which had not even been put into effect. Secondly, the initiative was driven forward by the great powers with the joint Franco-British Saint Malo declaration and the subsequent involvement of Germany (Hilz, 2005), which took over the EU Presidency in January 1999. Finally, the project was only allowed to move forward with the decision at the NATO Summit in April 1999 and thereby the United States agreeing to give EU access to NATO capabilities and planning assets (Hilz, 2005).

All this suggests that the development of the CFSP and ESDP remains a fundamentally intergovernmental process, with the member states as the main actors. The main driving force behind such changes is still provided by external factors in the international system and the response of member states to those factors, rather than some internal logic of integration from which a need is created for common policies and institutions in the area of foreign, security and defense policy.

Nevertheless, the debate on the EU as a security actor suggests exceptions to the general rule of intergovernmentalism. On some issues, EU actors were instrumental in proposing new areas of cooperation in security and defense. This is not to suggest that supranational institutions in the areas of security and defense are developing, but rather that the increasing degree of interdependence is leading member states to take steps towards common policy-making.

The result of the push and pull between, nation states striving to maintain their sovereignty and notion of interdependence leading the same nation states to seek common solutions, resulted in a Union that is developing into a joined-up security actor distinct from NATO. But NATO is a cornerstone of European security, and the
Union’s role in European security will to a large degree depend on its relationship with NATO.

The CSDP is thus the last place one would imagine supranational theories having any explanatory relevance, this being the archetypical example of so-called high politics. It is nevertheless worth considering the relevance of the integration theories in making sense of current political developments in Europe.

A convergence of national interests is obviously a necessary condition for the CSDP to develop, but it is hardly a sufficient explanation, in that it does not shed any light on why interests are converging. Member states obviously find it advantageous to cooperate in this field, but in order to understand, why we may have to move beyond the limits of traditional intergovermentalist theory. Thus, a traditional intergovernmental perspective is hardly adequate in explaining the processes that are currently taking place.

European Union is developing a distinct approach to international security and defense policy not in isolation, but in reaction to wider political developments. The EU is formed not only according to the logic of its own internal development, but also in reaction to global lines of political conflict. This process is neither linear nor smooth, but it has the potential to gradually reinforce itself. Whether by design or as the result of wider political developments, the EU is developing a stronger presence and identity in international relations.

### 3. EU Security Management

After the Cold War, it has been discerned that Europe would have to play a larger role in security matters than it had generally been accustomed to. Conflicts in the Balkans confirmed that prediction. At the same time, it made also clear that Europe lacked the capabilities needed to address post-Cold War security challenges thoroughly.

At first, Europeans responded to the challenge by creating the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) within NATO. CJTF, a multinational, multi-service arrangement, allowed for more flexible deployment of NATO assets through ad hoc arrangements (Hilz, 2005).

Despite this effort to improve flexibility, however, the subsequent Kosovo intervention made it clear that the European allies were not investing adequately in the capabilities needed to perform the humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions that framed NATO planning at the time. Almost a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries still lacked many of the capabilities necessary to conduct effective military operations outside NATO’s borders. To repeat just one oft cited statistic, during the Kosovo war on European soil, the US flew 70-80 percent of all strike sorties and dropped 80 percent of precision munitions (Gordon, 2000).

In 1999, a new initiative addressing the shortfalls that became apparent during the Kosovo intervention was launched at NATO Summit in Washington. The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 key capability shortfalls that merited investment and multinational cooperation. The DCI covered in particular to improve Alliance capabilities in the five areas: mobility and deployability; sustainability; effective engagement; survivability and interoperable communications (NATO Handbook, 2001).

Indeed, DCI’s long list of areas for improvement simply proved too ambitious
and did little more than paralyze action. In fact, most European defense budgets actually declined in the first few years following DCI’s launch (Floumoy & Smith, 2005). But, it soon became apparent that, DCI would not succeed in producing substantial changes in European military capabilities.

The 1999 DCI was succeeded by the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment. At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO launched a streamlined and more focused follow-on to DCI. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) outlined four critical areas for improvement, including: defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks; ensuring command, communications, and information superiority; improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces. The Prague declaration also recognized the need to think creatively about NATO assets, especially in light of shrinking European defense budgets. It stressed that efforts and initiatives to strengthen capabilities “could include multinational efforts, role specialization and reprioritization” (Prague Summit Declaration, 2002).

The hope was that, short of increasing their defense budgets, European countries would at least aim to spend their defense resources more wisely by eliminating waste and duplication and identifying other cost savings.

Considering PCC and past NATO initiatives, PCC has done more to strengthen European military capabilities. Nevertheless, progress remains slow and continues to be hindered in some cases by the lack of political will, shrinking defense budgets, and resistance to pooling initiatives.

Similar to NATO initiatives, the EU has undertaken also a number of efforts to bridge the European capability gaps. In order to build CFSP, all EU members have believed that the policy have to include some capacity to back that policy with force. In 1999 EU member states signed the Helsinki Headline Goal of being able to deploy a 60,000-strong crisis management force within sixty days and to sustain it for at least one year. This European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), designed to conduct “Petersberg Tasks” (defined in the Amsterdam Treaty as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), was slated to become operational by the end of 2003. The Helsinki Headline Goals served as much as a political signal about the need in 1999 of strengthening the European military arm after the almost traumatic experiences in the Western Balkans (Burwell et al., 2006).

When EU members compared the requirements of the Petersberg Tasks with their existing national commitments to the EU, they found several shortfalls. In an effort to address these shortfalls, the European Union launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. But there has been little progress in finding solutions (Burwell et al., 2006).

With the European Security Strategy of December 2003, a new set of Headline Goals were needed, and in May 2004 the EU Defense Ministers adopted the Headline Goal 2010. These new ambitions for military capabilities include a number of interesting, new thoughts, in particular the introduction of rapidly deployable Battle Groups of roughly 1500 troops, capable of deploying within 10 days after an EU decision to launch an
operation. Although the ECAP has been slow to trigger major changes in European military capabilities, it did spur the creation of the EU Battlegroups. A Battle Group (BG) is defined as the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The BG is based on a combined arm, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A BG is in principle based on multinationality and could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. Member States invited to participate in BGs included the non-EU European NATO countries, candidates for accession and other potential partners in their BGs. All EU States except Denmark have committed military capabilities to BGs (Burwell et al., 2006).

The BGs will spur EU members to develop the expeditionary capability they lack, but there are doubts about the viability of the overall concept. First, it is unclear whether EU member states will acquire the strategic lift needed to deploy the BGs in a timely fashion. Second, questions remain about the BGs’ relationship with the NATO Response Force and the extent to which their development might distract from the EU’s 2010 Headline Goals. Third, there are competing views on how and when the BGs will be used, with some countries envisioning a full spectrum of future missions and others suggesting that the BGs only be used for low-intensity missions (Gowan, 2005).

The BGs offer participation to all EU partners, whether big or small, and offers in particular smaller countries opportunities of pooling resources, role specialization and complementary capabilities. Scarce financial, technical and human resources have to be channeled towards viable objectives.

However, EU should also take a number of steps to improve its ability to conduct operations. The BGs should be strengthened through regular training and certification, preferably using NATO standards. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria.

The EU has also focused in recent years on strengthening its civilian capabilities for conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian missions. In 2004 Civilian Capabilities were committed simultaneously with military capabilities at the EU Civilian Capabilities Commitments Conference. The Civilian Headline Goal was developed with a target date of 2008 in order to secure interoperability, deployability and sustainability of civilian resources. This Headline Goal sets out the EU’s ambitions for civilian ESDP for the coming years and provides a firm basis for identifying requirements and establishing the capabilities needed. The Civilian Headline Goal also establishes a systematic approach for the further development of civilian capabilities. The EU’s assets for stabilization and reconstruction are valuable even in hostile environment (Burwell et al., 2006). It has been proved in the earlier operations. Thus, the EU’s military capability may remain limited, but it’s potential complementary role to NATO makes the cooperation between two organization both valuable and necessary.

The year 2004 is was pivotal for European Defence Capability development. The European Defense Agency (EDA) was created to further remedy capability shortfalls and steer the implementation of ESDP. The EDA is intended to improve the coordination and press EU member states, when necessary,
to make capability improvements (EU Focus, 2006). The EDA faces a number of tough challenges when we consider its ambitious set of missions such as: modernizing and strengthening Europe’s fragmented defense industry; eliminating duplication in arms research, development and procurement. Perhaps even more challenging, it will have to persuade the more equal members like the UK, France and Germany to commit to a European system they do not control completely or to an extent they desire.

The current mechanism between NATO and EU was formalized in the Berlin Plus arrangement, signed in March 2003. Under this agreement, the military cooperation mechanism through which the EU can have “assured access” to the collective assets and capabilities of Alliance, has been established. Berlin Plus refers to framework of EU-NATO relations.

In 1996, a NATO ministerial in Berlin agreed that in principle NATO assets could be made available for crisis management operations led by the Western European Union. At the 1999 NATO summit in Washington, Alliance leaders-initiated discussions on what became the main features of “Berlin Plus”: assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and presumed availability of certain NATO capabilities and common assets, along with determination of the role of NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe in EU-led operations.

Initially, these discussions took place between the Western European Union and NATO, but the role of the WEU was soon subsumed by the European Union. In January 2001, the EU and NATO began negotiations that eventually led to the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP” (December 16, 2002) and the Berlin Plus arrangements (March 17, 2003).

The later included:
- A NATO-EU security agreement governing the exchange of classified information;
- Assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations;
- Availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led operations;
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return, and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, who serves as the operation commander of an EU-led operation under Berlin Plus;
- NATO-EU consultation arrangements; and
- Incorporation within NATO’s established defense planning system of the military needs and capabilities possibly required for EU-led military operations (Burwell et al., 2006, p.13)

Nevertheless, the Berlin Plus arrangements cannot be seen as “indicators of a healthy NATO-EU relationship.” Under this agreement EU does not gain access to troops and equipment belonging to NATO members, only to certain NATO assets, such as the planning, force generation, and headquarters capabilities at SHAPE. The agreement does not provide also a mechanism for combining military and civilian capabilities in a particular operation. Consequently, Berlin Plus arrangements apply only after the result of the decision-making process is an EU-led
operation. In other words, Berlin Plus does not essentially facilitate the process when NATO or EU should take the lead and it does not provide a mechanism to launch combined operations in times of crisis as seen in Darfur crisis. “In Darfur Crisis, NATO and EU agreed to disagree, and two separate airlifts were established, with the expectation that they would be coordinated by the African Union” (Burwell et al., 2006).

In this regard, NATO and the EU must develop compatible capabilities and establish mechanisms that will allow a rapid coordinated response in times of crisis. If they are willing to work together effectively, they should recognize their relative crucial roles in transatlantic security. Thus, a willingness to make compromises on both sides of the Atlantic is necessary for the healthy future.

The current gap between requirements and capabilities poses serious obstacles to EU’s ability to execute out of area missions and to protect and advance its interests in the security environment. The EU crisis management operations will have their geographical focus constrained by shortfalls in enabling factors such as strategic mobility, specifically strategic capabilities as transport and logistics, command and control as well as reconnaissance. The EU’s global approach on deployability and interoperability will be a key element of CSDP development. Consequently, the proclaimed global role of the EU depends to a large extent on the EU’s ability to generate sufficient resources to overcome shortfalls in enabling factors of the CSDP.

4. Conclusion

The motivation behind the European quest for constructing a defense policy, despite not partaking any large scale military role for a long time is a good question to ponder. I believe there are internal reasons arising directly from the European integration dynamic itself and external reasons contingent on world events and developments in American policy. Thus, it is fair to say that the EU’s aspirations, world events and the US might be the chief impelling forces of the European Union’s security and defense policy.

The developments leading to the CSDP, particularly, the arrangements introduced in Brussels in January 1994 and concluded in Berlin in June 1996-, served as the basis for cooperation between the WEU and NATO. Concerns and misgivings were not very visible about aspects of ESDI that had been much discussed in the two years since the Berlin and Brussels agreements. But debate has become visible on the surface after the turning point of St. Malo. The US was surprised to see Britain and France in agreement on matters of military security and activities affecting NATO (Hunter, 2002). Secretary Albright emphasized these concerns with three D’s (Duplication, decoupling, and discrimination) at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the St. Malo meeting.

The Europeans are critically important security partners of the United States. For this reason, the emergence of CSDP ought to be a welcome development to the United States. Yet the CSDP process has turned out to be a bittersweet development.

1. There are also different methods to generate sufficient resources other than procurement or budget allocation for defense. For instance, pooling is one of the most effective way and may take a variety of forms, from contributing national assets to multinational formation, to sharing infrastructure and support assets, to undertaking common or coordinated procurements.
The debate over NATO’s future and CSDP continue to turn back to question over whether alliances in general make sense without adversary (Haglund, 2002). Nevertheless, many of today’s challenges to traditional and nontraditional security concerns can undoubtedly be worked out only if efforts and measures are taken across national boundaries. In the absence of a global consensus, regional measures and responses are suitable alternatives. As long as they are appropriate to each particular regional context, states do collaborate on, and coordinate their responses to political, economic and environmental threats (Schnabel, 2002).

As NATO has been changing and the European allies begin to play a greater role by developing their CFSP and adapting their armed forces to face the new threats more effectively, NATO, through CSDP, could work towards strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link at the same time. A robust CSDP anchored in NATO would make the Alliance much stronger and better equipped to face the new challenges. Under these conditions NATO would be in a much better position to promote stability and security in the changing Europe.

Nonetheless, the prospect of the EU becoming a security actor distinct from NATO remains important for the future development of the relationship between the CSDP and NATO and thus the EU and the United States. American support for the further development of the CSDP will depend on whether or not the CSDP is viewed as complementary to NATO.

Indeed, those in Europe who believe that they must weaken NATO to strengthen CSDP are only likely to achieve an insecure and incapable Europe unsure of itself and its role in the world. If they want the US to support CSDP, they must produce real capabilities and assume real peacekeeping responsibilities. Those in the United States who believe that strengthening CSDP means weakening NATO are only likely to achieve a lonely superpower unable to count on the added abilities and resources of its allies when it comes to facing new threats and risks. If they want European support for US initiatives, they must be willing to allow allies to develop the capacity to do so (Lindley, 2003). Thus, the US and EU relationship on security issues will be deepened and EU will be seen as a proper security actor.

Above all, CSDP can be seen as a driving force “not only to develop military capacity but also to further European integration.” Assuming that Europeans have long corroborated efforts for the EU to take on a larger role in the global arena, it would be that CSDP will be one domain in which Europe could get ahead, particularly if integration in other areas is blocked (Burwell et al., 2006). Last but not least, economics will be at least as large a factor as security strategy in defining Europe’s political choices on defense and security. Thus, the industrial base will be a factor for each policy option in European security architecture and in turn will be influenced by it.
Europe as a Security Actor and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

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Whither Humanitarian Intervention?

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1. Introduction

The UN Charter is a certification of the system created with the Westphalian Treaty of 1648, in that the charter recognizes the state as an equal member of the family of nations. As such, the state is to be respected and not interfered in its interior matters or its territory. The state has the responsibility to accommodate her citizens with fundamental human rights be it man or woman and dignity according to the preamble of the UN Charter. In Article 2 (4) it is openly stated that any member of UN should refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This is mostly known as the non-intervention. The only exceptions for that have been codified under 51st article as self-defense and measures to be taken for the preservation of the international peace and security authorized by Security Council.

That being said, the world we live on has seen many wrongdoings by governments or through their negligence/inability. In many cases; that went unpunished as in Darfur and Rwanda. In Bosnia, despite active lobbying and having taken consent of Russia and China, US could not convince Europeans to support its “Lift & Strike Plan”, resulting in genocide in Srebrenica, mass killings throughout the country and an impartial remapping of the country based on ethnical lines (Aybet, 2014). In Kosovo on the other hand, US led NATO forces moved to end atrocities without a mandate from UNSC as China and Russia opted to use their veto powers. UN Security Council has failed to react and take action to prevent humanitarian disasters in Congo and Syria. The question is “Is it almost impossible for international community to be consistent when applying the rule of law in humanitarian intervention in the international system?” I do argue that nations pursue realism driven foreign policy so unilateral and even multilateral intervention decisions are based on national interests more than humanitarian considerations. In this work, I start with background of humanitarian intervention, then reflect evolution of the concept together with reactions to the issue from many sides. Then I discuss the issue of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) and its variants to give an insight about the trajectory of the issue.

2. Humanitarian Intervention in Retrospect

The world witnessed a shift in support for the notion of humanitarian intervention in the aftermath of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviets for many meant West’s victory together with its values and institutions. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of the History was basically a pronouncement of the victory of the liberal values. In that unipolar world where the U.S. and Europe became the showcase for welfare and human rights, common understanding forced the balance between sovereignty and responsibility to tip towards the latter. Even greater than that was the revitalization of the UN Security Council. UN’s organ with the responsibility

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of preserving international peace and security had been paralyzed by counter vetoes of western and eastern blocs until then. To be more precise, from the creation of UN up till May 31, 1990 right of veto had been used 279 times rendering the Council incapable (Orford, 2003).

After the end of the Cold War however, UN Security Council felt itself more freehanded to act as both an executive and legislative power. As the body was tasked to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” by Article 41, the Council started to interpret the notion of “threat to the peace” more broadly to include state failure, genocide, ethnic cleansing, putsch, humanitarian crises, civil wars to dovetail legitimacy with legality. In this context from 1989 to 2003, there has been eleven interventions (Orford, 2003).

In 1991 Operation Safe Haven was conducted to protect Kurds in Northern Iraq. Then in 1992, U.S. together with UNOSOM mission intervened in Somalia to withdraw its soldiers after losing 18 rangers in a fight in Mogadishu. In 1994, French misconduct motivated by national interest ended in around 800,000 Rwandan deaths. In 1995 atrocities in Bosnia culminated by Srebrenica massacre due to the misconduct of EU and wrong attitudes towards former Yugoslavia. Only after the massacre was the gravity of the situation understood, which prompted action. Coming to 1999, haunted with the ghosts of Srebrenica, NATO led an operation to stop atrocities in Kosovo without a UN Security Council resolution (Pattison, 2010).

After NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to prevent duplication of new Bosnia, Secretary-General Kofi Annan found himself compelled to bridge the gap between the rhetoric and application of rule of law in the field of international relations. The toughness of finding a middle way between preventing genocide, and breaching a country’s sovereignty rights forced him to plead United Nations General Assembly in 1999 and 2000 to reach a consensus on this question: “... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity? (ICISS, 2001)

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was formed under the sponsorship of Canadian government in 2000. Its aim was to find normative answers to the dilemma posed by Annan. The Commission was co-chaired by Mohamed Sahnoun and Gareth Evans, Australia’s former foreign minister and an international lawyer (Baumont, 2013). On December 2011, the Commission came up with an overambitious “Responsibility to Protect Report”. The report was simply based on two basic principles which were:

State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (ICISS, 2001).

The report was a build-up upon the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility” originally developed by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen for the issue of Internally Displaced
Person (IDPs). As the concept was introduced for Africa in 1980s and took a different turn with Kofi Annan’s “two sovereignties” in 1990s (Kassim, 2014). The report tried to set some objective standards as triggers to push UN Security Council take action in order not to let happen new Rwanda. Accordingly, mass killings and ethnic cleansing were defined as two “just cause thresholds” and if host state was not able or willing to stop atrocities, the responsibility would fall on UN Security Council to take action. The P-5 (Five permanent UN Security Council members) were not to use veto card if the conditions were met and vital national interests were not at stake. On the other hand, creating clear-cut conditions to respond would at the same time make it easier for governments to defend their decisions in front of local public. Last issue was publication of intents. According to the report, having based decisions on standards defined in the report, proponents of taking humanitarian action would openly tell the grounds for their decisions in the council whereas those opposing would openly vote against and publicly speak up about their concerns. The main idea behind this was that in a situation where openly human rights were abused; the nations would not so easily go against a humanitarian decision (Bellamy, 2005).

As can be guessed, the Responsibility to Protect Report of December 2001 caused severe discussions. The reactions were focused on two subjects. The legality and the legitimacy of the Humanitarian Intervention. Those critique are as follows:

3. Reactions to Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect

3.1. Proponents (Interventionists)

The proponents of responsibility to protect, labeled as interventionists, can be studied under two subgroups based on their reference points or arguments. Those are:

3.1.1. Legalists

For the legalists, the case for humanitarian intervention has become especially possible after the Cold War. The UNSC’s authority enshrined in Article 41 to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” constitutes the legal basis for any such action. UN Security Council is the authority to decide what constitutes a “threat to peace” under article 39 of the Charter. In a historical perspective, following the end of the Cold War; UNSC’s understanding of “threat to peace” has added more ingredients to extend the legal base for humanitarian interventions through its interpretations (Wheeler, 2000).

For many other legalists, unilateral or multilateral forcible humanitarian intervention is clearly permissible when UN Charter is read carefully. In this sense, the Charter gives equal weight to human rights as security. This is especially obvious in the preamble, Articles 1(3), 55 and 56 of the Charter. In all those articles, the UN has been directed to ensure and promote the observance for overall practice of fundamental human rights with no distinction of race, sex or ethnic roots. So, UN is actually responsible to interfere if any state does not allow the practice of those rights or does not have the capacity to guard those rights and values. If the state does not want to or cannot bear that responsibility, UN has to make it happen (Baylis et al., 2008).

As being the co-chairs of the report, Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun emphasize the recent shift in understanding of sovereignty to hint at a change towards
national and international accountability from a sovereign’s impunity. They argue that the sovereignty has transformed into a Janus-faced entity with responsibilities looking in two directions. One is the responsibility towards other states in the form of respecting other states’ sovereignty. The other responsibility is towards its own people in the form of respecting their dignity and basic rights. So, image of an omnipotent state with no limits to determine its demeanor towards its people is outdated. The new norm is sovereignty as responsibility. Not reaching to the point of accepting responsibility to protect as an element of customary international law, they do claim it to be an emerging de facto norm in practice (Evans and Shahnoun, 2002).

3.1.2. Moralists

Moralists on the other hand argue that international community has a moral mission as to alleviate the grief of people suffering from atrocities. Claiming that the laws are made to restore order and preserve welfare, in cases where conformance to those laws will result in opposite of what they were meant for is nonsense and ill breeding. Being a moralist; Michael Reisman, citing four unilateral interventions in 1979 tries to create a moral case for the issue. In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda to expel Idi Amin government to restore Milton Obote, French forces made a coup to expel Jean Bedel Bokassa and install a different president in Central African Republic, Vietnam entered Cambodia to remove Pol Pot government and install a pro-Vietnam government instead and last Soviet forces entered Afghanistan to support a government which would not survive if not for Soviet push. Efforts to make the Council condemn the first two attempts were rejected and two condemnations ensued for the last to attempts. Reisman argues that the laws are made to restore order. There may be cases where intervention in conflict with the Charter may be in perfect conformity of the soul of the rule as is the case for the first two of those actions above (Reisman, 1985).

Another moralist, Fernando R. Tesón, claims that sovereignty of the state is derived from the legitimacy of the social contract. In a situation where half the population is murdering the other half, both sovereignty and inviolability of a nation’s borders have lost their strength. Teson makes an analogy for better insight by giving an example. In the example there is a federal state, where a provincial government is ethnically cleansing a group and has raised a provincial army to resist the federal army in case the federal army tries to stop atrocities. He argues that non-interventionists will lament a civil war but still will not object to an intervention. He asks what if the same kind of atrocities are committed at a neighboring country. What kind of difference do the borders create in this case? He further argues that national borders derive their importance from justice and efficiency. If those values are assailed by tyranny and anarchy, treating the borders as sacrosanct will always bring about more problems (Tesón, 2003).

Anne Orford, describing the zeitgeist in the aftermath of the atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica, argues that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was a welcomed event based on “a long overdue internationalization of the human conscience” (ICISS, 2001, p.vii). The UN’s allowing genocides in both states created discussions about the organization’s impartiality in the face of atrocities. The argument behind is that impartiality is exhibited before two or more equals. Aggressors and victims certainly do not fit this definition (Orford, 2011).
James Pattison, highlighting the great cost of non-intervention in Rwanda, claims that even the deeply skeptical about humanitarian intervention will justify any action if the humanitarian crisis is gravely serious. So, questions of legitimacy or legality of humanitarian intervention is outdated if not for all. There is widespread support for humanitarian intervention in cases where large-scale human suffering is relevant. The question that requires answers is not if or why, but it is “who should do it?” (Pattison, 2010)

James Pattison warns about the pitfall of confusing legality and legitimacy of any humanitarian intervention. According to him those two terms refer to different things in contrast with what is generally believed. Even though an intervention has been made in accordance with the norms, laws and procedures regarding the international law, that does not mean that it is morally justifiable. Any action to be legitimate should be morally justifiable (Pattison, 2010).

3.2. Opponents (Restrictionists)

Scholars rejecting the legitimacy of any humanitarian intervention have a same stand for R2P also. To start with; a group of scholars do carry the apprehension that the nations willing to interfere would not do so taking into account the lifeless bodies sent back home as casualties. A government that does allow atrocities creates a negative image of a government whereas loss of life for strangers does the same thing. Public opinion is fickle. The US withdrawal from Somalia after losing 18 rangers in a fight in Mogadishu is a good example for that. So, they do believe that feigned benevolence on the side of great powers is just a disguise above their real intentions or calculated self-interests. That is to say, the decision for humanitarian intervention is actually a pretense. If not for self-interest, the history we know now would not have chapters on Rwanda and Darfur (Bayliss et al., 2008).

James Pattison argues that humanitarian intentions and humanitarian motives should be distinguished. He defines humanitarian intention as that “the intervener has the purpose of preventing, reducing, or halting the humanitarian crisis”. Humanitarian motive is on the other hand “underlying reason for undertaking humanitarian action”. South Africa may want to help terminate humanitarian crisis in Mozambique with an underlying motive of stopping refugees flooding within its borders. The intention in this case is humanitarian, but motive is self-calculation. Pattison warns that international community in many cases conflate those two terms to one to discredit any humanitarian intervention. A state’s ultimate pre-requisite for a legitimate intervention is to have a humanitarian intention. That state may not have a humanitarian motive (Pattison, 2010).

Muhammad Ayoob on the other hand argues that humanitarian interventions are made selectively on the basis of self-interest calculations. Called selectivity in the literature, this phenomenon prevents reaching a uniform rule that can be applied to each case. As such this effect makes the intervention illegitimate (Ayoob, 2002). Anne Orford warns about the same hazard suggesting creation of standard criteria to be applied when conditions met. She suggests by this way no regions would be neglected (Orford, 2011). James Pattison claims that in many cases the intervener may select an option to use resources efficiently, not undertaking a task above its capacity or not be seen as an invader. In cases where two cases exist with same burden but one with
obvious material returns to the intervener. As it had been mentioned before, an intervention with no humanitarian intention is illegitimate. Pattison questions what about the consequences. If the lives of millions are at stake does it really matter the intentions of the intervener?

Another paramount argument concerns unilateral humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, giving such authority to intervene on self judgement for states will bring about new problems where it will be used as a pretext to settle scores. To refresh memories, Hitler’s argument behind invasion of Czechoslovakia was to protect Germans in the country. Coming closer, motives behind US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was to eliminate weapons of destruction and cut country’s support for religiously oriented terrorists. As it turned out to be after the war, there were no weapons of mass destruction nor was there a tenable link between the government and religiously oriented terrorists (Bayliss et al., 2008).

Moving from the same example, Iraqi invasion created such conditions that there came religious extremists from all over the world to Iraq to make it a center for new terrorist organizations to thrive, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) being one. In Syria, more than six million fled the country and about 500,000 people died. The country became a hotbed of terrorism and human rights abuses. Making deductions from similar examples, a fifth group contend that intervention does not work.

Another group consists of those who refuse humanitarian intervention but are against R2P based on reasons enumerated below:

However logical, legal or ethical humanitarian intervention might seem, restrictionists believe that the UNSC has been entitled to decide on that and act in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. So, there is no need for additional institutions or efforts, hinting at R2P.

Actually, this statement is not true based on past experiences. There have been cases like Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo in 1990s that it had not been possible to get a UNSC Resolution to stop atrocities. Actually, the case for Kosovo sets another precedent to support Moralists’ standpoint. The example of Bosnia and genocide in Srebrenica at hand, NATO did not stand idle waiting for a UNSCR to materialize while China and Russia blocked it. Evans and Sahnoun claim that the international order materialized in its most conspicuous way. However, UN cannot withstand another situation like the one in Kosovo again. The questioning of UN will bring an end to it (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002).

A second group headed by Venezuela fear of abuse. Countries mostly composed of weak states contend that “The Responsibility to Protect” was another convenience created for the powerful countries to interfere in weak states’ domestic issues without feeling necessity to seek international support (Bellamy, 2005).

A third group comprised mostly of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) rejects the concept. India, a forerunner of the group, argues that the UNSC has sufficient assets and powers to intervene in humanitarian emergencies. They claim that past failures are not due to a lack of authority, but a lack of political will (Bellamy, 2005). Initially skeptical of the concept, India agreed with the first two tenets of the concept stipulating the state to protect its people and international community to monitor
states and help build capacity to prevent humanitarian crises. However, the third pillar urging international community to act in a timely and decisive manner raises concerns for India. Attaching great attention to the prudent use of force, India is for questioning timeline of military interventions and their conduct. It aims to contribute to the issue in reaching a consensus on the conduct of such operations (Mohan, 2014).

4. Where Are We?

The creators of responsibility to protect report had to take into account the critiques. In this respect, to give it a chance to survive, a draft had to be drawn answering those concerns. To start with; as being the countries mostly to be expected to contribute for any humanitarian intervention, P-5 except for UK were skeptical about the report from outset. The U.S. did not want to make a recommitment, China and Russia showed UNSC as the proper platform not to allow any unauthorized action, UK and France were worried that a consensus on criteria would not suffice for an efficient response. India on the other hand held the position that UN had the authority to act in case of need and claimed that previous failures were not due to lack of authority but lack of political will. Though generally supporting, Western civil society was more concerned about the vagueness of the responsibility to protect in case that UNSC refuses to take action. Last, headed by African countries, the weak states were more concerned that adoption of the concept would facilitate strong states’ interventions by creating a pretext (Bellamy, 2005).

In order to appease P-5, the commissioners insisted that any intervention should be authorized by Security Council. They omitted their previous insistence that P-5 commit themselves to limit the use of veto card where just cause war was met (Bellamy, 2005). Canadian ex-Prime Minister Paul Martin argued that The Responsibility to Protect “is not a license for intervention; it is an international guarantor of international accountability.” (Martin, 2004) Canadian government’s position was more elaborately reflected in the “non-paper,” submitted to the High Level Panel (HLP).” The non-paper reiterated the centrality of sovereignty, going as far as to articulate the pluralist view that if humanitarianism can only be “undertaken at the cost of undermining the stability of the state-based international order,” then sovereignty should trump humanitarian action.” Looking from the other side, an ICISS commissioner Ramesh Thakur argued that the criteria set were obstacles to prevent states from abusing humanitarian action, using it as a pretext to attain their geopolitical purposes (Bellamy, 2005).

With the invasion of Iraq where U.S. acted without a UNSCR, the debate about the legality of interventions again exacerbated. In response, Kofi Annan convened High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Panel created a report with the name “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” to become a remarkable one in that it originated from UN itself and offered an extraordinary shift from traditional thinking about international law. Repeating the ICISS Report, the report posited that there existed a norm with the name “responsibility to protect” in cases of “genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law.” Before 2005 World Summit, Annan released a report for debate with the name: “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”. The report reflected ICISS report by reiterating the main arguments
of the former. Together with many issues, responsibility to protect was also discussed by states and it carved out its space in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome in two paragraphs, 138 and 139 (Eaton, 2011).

The Outcome read:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out (UNGA, pr.138-9, 2005).

With this outcome document, UN General Assembly defined the responsibilities of both nations and the international society against the case of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in three pillars. The first pillar comprised state’s responsibility to preserve rights and dignity of its people. The second was international society’s responsibility to help any state to keep the first pillar intact. The third pillar stipulated international society to take action in a spectrum from mild to the harshest including the use of force in accordance with UN Security Council mandate to help protect the population if state fails to do so (Avezov, 2013).

It is possible to claim that the rise of R2P has not been so easy. After its adoption by UN General Assembly, the concept was fiercely debated especially because it threatened the state sovereignty set by Westphalia. Russia and China were extremely averse to the concept together with developing countries like India, Egypt, Venezuela, Sudan, Cuba and Malaysia. After six months of intense discussions in the Council, the concept was adopted unanimously in the Security Council this time (Kassim, 2014).
5. Responsibility to Protect, Its Variants and Beyond

Having been born as a norm in the UN World Summit in 2005, the responsibility to protect was used as the legal basis for French intervention in Ivory Coast in 2011, in Mali in 2013, and for NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011. However good motives behind the concept, today it is possible to claim that it has lost its shine it had in 2010. According to Gareth Evans, one of co-chairs of the report, the implementation of the norm in Libya and ensuing debates in the Security Council has led to the debacle of the consensus about the norm. According to him, the apprehension of countries headed by BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) became solid after they realized that the P3 (US, UK and France), responsible for the implementation of the norm would not settle unless Qaddafi was removed from office. To be more precise; interveners rejected serious ceasefire offers, bombed facilities that had no obvious military significance [like the compound in which Gaddafi’s relatives were killed], killed fleeing personnel that posed no immediate risk to civilians, supported the rebel side to exacerbate the conflict resulting in a civil war and ignored the very explicit arms embargo in the process. What’s more, interveners used two UNSC Resolutions as an open check to do whatever they wanted without feeling the necessity to brief the Council about the developments and consult it (Beaumont, 2013). To an extent, P3 produced explanations for accusations, however they had no answer for accusations concerning the breaching of arms embargo and the process followed after the authorization of UNSCRs (Kassim, 2014).

This way, the operation in Libya created a twist of fate for R2P. The argument that R2P is just another tool to give a good pretense for imperial ambitions of superpowers was felt strongly after the intervention.

Actually, Libya does not constitute the only example for deterioration of the concept. To start with, Russia made a unilateral intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Russian claims directed towards Georgian Government were allegedly to commit atrocity crimes against South Ossetians. Labeling Georgian actions as “genocide”, Russian Government pretended feeling compelled to react (Evans, 2009). Foreign Minister Lavrov openly stated that their actions were an exercise of responsibility to protect (BBC, 2014). Russia’s ironic use of R2P in its offensives in Georgia provided counter-arguments and undermined the concept. In its latest intervention in Ukraine, military annexation of Crimea, Russian claims were that there were genocidal neo-Nazis in the region threatening the livelihood of ethnic Russians. So, Putin raised R2P rhetoric to support his acts in Ukraine (Katteri, 2014). In the Outcome Document of 2005 General Assembly, it is clearly stated that any country to address a R2P situation has to seek UNSC Consent or Resolution. There may be dire situations where a country blocks a resolution by vetoing the action as it is the case in Syria. Russian case does not fit that situation. The Russian side did not even try to bring the matter to the Council (Evans, 2009). Apparently, R2P added a new argument in those interventions for justification.

Abiodun Williams claims that R2P has been invoked several times since 2005. In December 2007, it was invoked for crisis in Kenya rightfully with intended results. In May 2008, it was invoked after a cyclone (Nargis Cyclone) hit Myanmar killing some 140,000
people. There was no consensus on R2P to be applied for natural disasters. So, this can be classified as an inappropriate invocation. In summer of 2010, it was invoked rightfully about the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, but did not accomplish intended goals. The fourth example is the bloodiest conflict since WWII in DRC, where unarmed civilians were killed, mass rapes were committed, and child soldiers were used. In the explicit transgressing of R2P thresholds, there has been no invocation yet (Williams, 2011).

In light of the dismal statistics, Evans Gareth warns the international society about the abuse of the term coined and created after a hard work not to have other Rwandas or Bosnias. Be it genuine or cynical, misapplication of R2P has the potential to sow the ill understanding that the term is just another tool for great powers to project power (Evans, 2008).

Anne Orford on the other hand argues that R2P is not a law that imposes duties upon states or UN. It is rather a form of law that confers powers and allocates jurisdiction. That is why critiques made on the imperfections in exercise does not reflect a correct understanding. What has been achieved in the World Summit is a normative convenience providing legal authorization for certain kinds of activities. The outcome is not an order binding with orders and expecting obedience. R2P develops the idea that while states are responsible from their own populations’ well-being, UN do the same for the whole international community (Orford, 2011).

In an attempt to bridge the gap between the good will and problems of abuse, Brazilian Prime Minister on September 21, 2011 spoke at the UN General Assembly, introducing a new term, namely “Responsibility While Protecting-RWP”. She posited that to add substance to discussions about the conduct of the Operation in Libya based on UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 and the look to the operation itself from different countries’ perspectives; responsibility while protecting should be developed together with responsibility to protect. What she demanded was to make feel the Western countries the apprehension of the other states, especially of BRICS and developing countries. On November 9, 2011 the concept was expounded by a concept paper to the Security Council. On the same day the “Responsibility While Protecting” was explained by Foreign Minister of Brasil, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota in the General Assembly (Kassim, 2014).

What Brazil suggested was complementing of R2P via the principles of the proposed RWP. The concept paper in this sense stipulated:

All three pillars of the R2P “must follow a strict line of political subordination and chronological sequencing” (para. 6);

All peaceful means have to be exhausted; a “comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible consequences of military action” (para. 7) must precede the consideration of the use of force;

The use of force can only be authorized by the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the Charter, or (and this is noteworthy) “in exceptional circumstances, by the General Assembly, in line with its resolution 377 (V)” (para. 11 c);

The authorization of the use of force must “be limited in its legal, operational and temporal elements”, and the enforcement must remain true to “the letter and the spirit” of the explicit mandate (para. 11 d);
To ensure proper monitoring and assessment of the interpretation and implementation of the Responsibility While Protecting, “enhanced Security Council procedures are needed” (para. 11 h). The Security Council is also obliged to “ensure the accountability of those to whom authority is granted to resort to force” (para. 11 i) (Benner, 2013).

Brazil’s offer was initially given a cold shoulder especially by Western powers, mostly seeing RWP as an element to degrade the notions in R2P. Western approach to all three pillars with the same importance was being gradualized and precautions not entailing force were being prioritized in RWP. In a report General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon stated that those pillars had equal importance. On February 2013, US representative to the Open Dialogue on RWP criticized the temporal approach of Brazilian government for ignoring the need for a comprehensive approach to risks and costs and for causing results that may cause the international community not to take action as required, based on unrealistic perfectionist expectations and methods. France, UK and Germany were of the same ideas positing that mass atrocities had the probability to be made in just a few days as was the case in Rwanda and very strict procedural bindings would prevent flexible action (Welsh et al., 2013).

After its membership tenure terminated, Brazil did not do much to champion the RWP, but rather let the process unfold by itself. However, the discussions and the quest for a solution shared by both the West and the East did not cease to exist. A Chinese journalist, Ruan Zongze published the stipulation of a concept called “Responsible Protection” to complement R2P. The main sense behind the article was that R2P was an overly elusive great idea. It should be garnered with more down-to-earth precautions not to let any action based on it get off handle. The article basically built on RWP. Before a mandate allowing military action was granted, every kind of effort running the gamut from diplomatic to economic should be exhausted. Then if of no avail, last resort, legitimate intention, balance of consequences and proportionality principles should be satisfied accordingly. After a mandate; effective supervision not to stray from the focus of protection should be implemented. Chinese Foreign Ministry stood behind this concept. On October 2013, the ministry’s think tank, the China Institute of International Studies arranged a two-day meeting in Beijing to refine R2P. Then at the end of the same month, in Moscow this time, the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a meeting bringing the most important people about R2P including UN Special Adviser on R2P, Professor Jennifer Welsh to discuss the issue and the developing new concepts, namely RWP and RP. Arranged by the initiative of Minister Lavrov himself, the meeting reflected a Russian need to align itself with the concept as confessed by the Minister (Evans, 2013).

All these developments and discussions during those meetings point at several facts that needs to be taken into account for a better insight and better solutions based on that. First from the way it has been supported by actors both from East and the West; it is understood that sovereignty as responsibility, the main theme behind R2P has taken roots in the international community. Second, the Operation in Libya in 2011 created a disillusionment on the side of East including BRICS causing a more precautious approach to R2P. The sides’
struggle to complement it with RWP or RP does not aim at undermining the concept but rather to shed light upon their feelings about the concept and willingness to make it one shared by both East and the West (Evans, 2013).

Reverting back to Syria, is the deadlock in the Security Council resulting in an inaction a result of this difference of understanding? This question has found many answers varying in proportions of truthfulness. An analyst in SIPRI, Xenia Avezov attracts our attention back to one of the main problems of humanitarian intervention, escaping the debates of historical spiral. It is the matter of selectivity that blocks an action she claims. Accordingly, the most solid ground for inaction indicates the unwillingness for costly, problematic interventions with fairly no guaranteed success and timeline. Apparently, no country feels itself solid enough to undertake such an enterprise in face of nearly no incentive (Avezov, 2013).

Here comes the clash of ideals and realities in play. On the one hand we have an operation in Libya which took 6 months from planning to the termination, whereas in Congo where the greatest bloodshed has been committed since WWII has not seen any intervention yet (Thielke, 2005). What is more, all that debate on R2P, RWP or RP does not address this issue of selectivity.

A bold confession about the future of R2P comes from Gareth Evans. He says:

> What punctured the optimism that the world might be on its way to ending internal mass atrocity crimes once and for all is the controversy that erupted in the security council in 2011 about the way the norm was applied in the NATO-led intervention in Libya, and the paralysis that in turn generated in the council’s response to Syria. I believe that – like most midlife crises – this one will prove survivable ... but I can’t pretend that its full realization will not be a work in progress for a long time to come (Beaumont, 2013).
Whither Humanitarian Intervention?

Bibliography


Appendix - Charter of the United Nations

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights
of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by
the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save
in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic
and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San
Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to
the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to
be known as the United Nations.

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures
   for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
   or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
   the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
   situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
   and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
   peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
   cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
   for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in
accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to a of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

**Article 39**

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 4 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**Article 41**

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

**Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
The Implications of Gender on International Migration

Cihan Aydiner *

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to provide a critical review of the literature of gender in international migration studies. After presenting and analyzing the role of gender in general concepts/drivers of global migration, I focus on how gender shapes the major causes of global migration and the connections of gender with international migration, from migration decision-making to integration/assimilation processes. This work also addresses the process of integrating highly-educated women migrants/refugees into the economy. I analyze the main approaches, concepts, theories, methodologies, and substantive issues. Finally, I summarize the major points made herein and provide evidence of my perspective and projections regarding the directions in which research in this area might proceed.

Keywords: International Migration, Highly-Educated Women Migrants/Refugees, Migration Decision-Making, Integration/Assimilation Processes, Critical Review.

1. Introduction

Immigration is increasing both internally and internationally, and this has been especially true in the past three decades (Castles, 2010). Although it is neither less important than nor unconnected to international migration, this study does not address internal migration, since there are very few valid comparative studies on the issue, with only a few exceptions (such as King & Skeldon, 2010). I focus on international migration (both voluntary and forced) and the implications of gender since this affects the migration process. While the most important drivers of migration stem from global issues such as inequality, international energy conflicts, and developed countries’ involvement in the management of developing nations, the literature tends to focus on micro-level issues (Bloemraad, Korteweg, & Yurdakul, 2008, p. 154).

A comprehensive literature review will assist in discussions of less-studied and ignored areas (e.g., gender) related to the sociology of migration and link the topic to broader issues in sociology.

In the pages that follow, I examine these issues in greater detail. In Part 1, I begin this discussion by exploring the gender in most widely-mentioned concepts and dichotomies in sociological immigration literature. These perspectives, I argue, are limited and do not cover the embedded characteristics of immigration and the experiences of different gender groups in the migration process. They are closely related to reactions resulting from significant migration flows and the relative interests of receiving countries. However, it is useful to follow the literature’s development from dichotomies and easy answers to more inherent, multi-dimensional,

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and interdisciplinary perspectives. I use Massey and colleagues’ generally accepted summary of contemporary theories of international migration (Massey et al., 1993). I classify these theories according to Massey’s initiation and perpetuation to underscore the relationship with international migration. I focus on the development of concepts and theories related specifically to gender and immigration issues. Then, I discuss the gender in structure and agency approach in “middle-range theories” to underscore new developments in migration studies (Castles, 2010, p. 1574). I conclude by critiquing increasingly common academic trends in explaining immigration and argue for possible directions for the development of future gendered theoretical discussions.

In Part 2, I examine gender in the major causes, since this topic has generally been ignored and only infrequently embedded within the context of immigration (Castles, 2013). I begin by discussing the main arguments regarding major causes and macro-level links to migration. Then, I focus on the implications of global inequality, the north-south gap, and the inequalities that exist within receiving countries. I end this section by examining the lack of reliable and comparative data, and certain new efforts toward developing better datasets (Solt, 2009), in the hopes of isolating the reasons behind the search for middle-range theories.

In Part 3, I turn to the settlement process by analyzing gender and immigrants’ integration in developed countries. I discuss the dimensions of integration, as well as acculturation attitudes and strategies (Rohmann, Florack, & Piontkowski, 2006). I add two emerging concepts, identity and religion since they have been discussed frequently in recent acculturation literature and evaluate experiences of gender groups in each dimension of integration. Then, I emphasize the commonalities and differences among highly educated or skilled refugees and other immigrants, especially in terms of gender and labor market integration. I conclude by demonstrating possible directions for this field of inquiry.

In the final part, I elaborate upon the major points made in this paper, provide evidence for my perspective, and summarize my projections regarding the direction in which research in this area might proceed.

2. Part I: Gender in Immigration Theories and General Concepts

Immigration does not have a single, comprehensive, generally accepted theory (Castles, 2003; Massey et al., 1993) to explain its dynamics. Moreover, generally little work on immigration unequivocally researches for gender issues (Morrison, Schiff, & Sjoblom, 2008). Although some scholars have tried to find “integrate[d]” migration theories (Massey et al., 1993, p. 432), such studies have been criticized for not properly separating different levels (i.e., micro- and macro-) of analysis on the topic (Bakewell, 2010), selectively employing different theories (Castles, 2007), ignoring forced migration (van Hear, 2010), neglecting gendered characteristics of displaced people, and examining migration processes with a male-dominated perspective (Kanaiaupuni, 2000).

Immigration theories are pervaded with dichotomies. I discuss the most frequently mentioned dichotomies that appear in recent literature and the role of gender in these concepts and theories. They include push-pull theories (Portes & Borocz, 1989) of migration, internal and international migration (Castles, 2010), forced and voluntary (primarily labor)
migration (Bakewell, 2010), micro- and macro-perspectives (van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004), and Massey and colleagues’ widely supported theoretical dichotomy of “initiation” (1993, p. 432) and “perpetuation” (p. 448). Though some scholars have criticized the use of dichotomies due to inherent drawbacks such as explaining the effects of social structures and specific cases of push migrants (Fussell, 2012, p. 26), these dichotomies have commonly been used in immigration literature and are helpful for showing how gender issues have been involved or neglected in main approaches, concepts, and theories.

Push-pull theories. These focus solely on labor migration, tending to make two predictions: migration flow moves from developing nations to developed nations, and appears without any macro-effects. However, these assumptions cannot explain the concentration and direction of certain changes in size, historically preferred routes and locations, the different individual choices of people of the same region (Portes & Borocz, 1989), or the different gender influences on migration decision (Commission of the European Communities, 2000). Also, the inability of push-pull theories to explain movement can be extended to the important effects of immigration policies, migrant networks abroad, easy reachability of information about the immigration process, and how these effects are gendered. For example, early studies predicted that women moved as dependents while men moved for labor purposes. Later research complicates this by showing different reasons such as the movement for marriage (Kofman, 1999) and women’s increasing single migration (Lutz, 2010).

Moreover, even in household migration, gender roles may be different in destination countries than in origin countries. Some supportive findings on this are related to migration policies, job markets’ needs (e.g., high demand for nurses and domestics), and women’s higher employment rates in Western countries.

2.1. Internal-international migration binary

Internal migration is much more common than international migration, and the number of people forced to relocate internally has increased in recent decades (Castles, 2003). However, immigration scholars have primarily focused on international immigration and have had little interaction with internal migration scholars and their topics of interest (Castles, 2010). Also, gendered understandings of internal and international migration have been neglected in the literature. Some possible explanations for this could relate to the pre-1980s’ assumptions that the migrants are predominantly males searching for better labor opportunities and that females accompany them. However, we now know that these assumptions are not correct (Pedraza, 1991). Migration studies began to include gender in the 1980s. The first-wave of these studies typically added women to the existing studies on migration, oftentimes as a variable. However, newer studies in the 2000s examined the relational role of gender and accomplished a more coherent perspective on gender and migration (King, Dalipaj, & Mai, 2006). Recent studies have argued that there is a critical linkage between internal and international migration. These studies found that disregarding any type of migration causes a study to be incomplete (van Hear, 2010). However, gender has not taken into account in the interactions of internal and international migration studies with a few exceptions (see Curran & Rivero-
The Implications of Gender on International Migration

Fuentes, 2003), which shows the impact of gendered networks on internal and international migration.

2.2. Forced and voluntary migration

The sociology of immigration literature has improved mostly in terms of voluntary migration (Castles, 2003), and to a lesser degree has covered involuntary or forced migration (Fussell, 2012). Also, this is true for gender and forced migration studies. However, some recent studies examine gender analysis of forced migration (Krystalli, Hawkins, & Wilson, 2018) and explore the experiences of forced migrants who move due to their gender identities or sexual orientation (Alessi, 2016). Although forced migrants are significant in number, similar to that of internally displaced persons, they are mostly excluded from the scope of migration research. Some scholars have argued that the reasons for this reduced interest are related to the dependent decision process of these forced people (i.e., suppressive regimes) and their sensitive political status in receiving countries (Bakewell, 2010).

2.3. Micro- and macro-perspectives

A variety of classic theories have used micro- and macro-level analyses to explain the causes of international migration (van Tubergen et al., 2004). However, most of the studies have not considered the role of gender in popular migration theories. A few exceptions of gendered perspectives in migration theories are related to micro-level theories of labor migration theory and recent studies on the integration of immigrants. Major theories of integration have not interested in gender except some partial contribution of segmented assimilation theory regarding the gender gap in educational incorporation process of girls and boys (Donato, Gabaccia, Holdaway, Manalansan, & Pessar, 2006). While micro-level structures tend to focus on the decision processes of individuals and families (e.g., neoclassical economics) in widely cited migration theories, researches have based their theories predominantly on male migrants and have neglected the role of gender in family decisions. Macro-level theories advocate that global forces give rise to migration, such as in world systems theory (Massey et al., 1993). However, the literature has almost no attention to gender in classic macro theories with a few exceptions such as Mahler and Pessar’s (2001) gendered geography of power, which refers to the role of gender across transnational spaces beyond immigrants’ origin states. Also, studies increasingly mentioned meso-level structures like communities and regions, stressing the importance of linkages of different scopes (Bakewell, 2010; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hunter, Luna, & Norton, 2015; Portes, 2010). Recent gender and migration studies have attempted to fill in the gaps in these theories by combining different methods and understanding the topic as relational and contextual (Donato et al., 2006). Lutz’s study is an important example of gender analysis in the migratory process since she examines micro, meso, and macro perspectives. Her paper focuses on gender in the migratory process by showing the absence of women in previous studies and presenting a new conceptual framework to show gender within social change. Lutz treats gender as a key element in the migratory process. She examines three aspects of gender (labor market, organization of work, individual practices/identities) in three analytical levels (macro, meso, micro) (2010). This analysis helps to understand how immigrants follow gender-specific migration patterns (2010, p. 1658).


2.4. Initiation and perpetuation of migration

Massey examined most of the known international migration theories as they relate to two main conditions, initiation and perpetuation. Many scholars have reiterated and supported Massey’s approach (Fussell, 2012; Portes, 2010). He explained initiation theories of migration under the following titles: neoclassical, new economics, dual labor market, and world systems theory. He used the following perpetuation titles for when migration begins: network, institutional, cumulative causation, and migration systems theory (Bakewell, 2010; Massey et al., 1993). These theories mostly come from the discipline of economics oftentimes neglecting gender. Donato et al. describe the problem as follows:

*Although more women are migrating than in the past, traditional explanations for men’s migration do not apply to women. Decisions to migrate are made within a larger context of gendered interactions and expectations between individuals and within families and institutions. Therefore, gender is critically important to consider before the development of theory* (2006, p. 12).

However, some gender and migration studies have examined the possible role of gender in initiation and perpetuation theories. For example, Shauman and Noonan support new economics theory and examine migration as a family decision. They found that the relationship between family migration and job success depends on job market characteristics in gender-specific ways in addition to individual and familial differences (2007).

The network theory of migration refers to migrants’ agency and how it helps them in their movement and unification processes (Castles, 2010; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Kanaiaupuni argues that migrant networks offer similar support for men and women (2000). Neoclassical theories have seen migration as an individual decision, and women have not been evaluated in migration decision since they generally accepted as wives or mothers. However, new economics theory stresses the importance of family in migration decision, though these theories explicitly examine the role of gender in the decision process (Boyd & Grieco, 2003).

Next, I discuss trends in the theoretical development of gender and migration studies.

2.5. Gender in a Recent Approach: Structure and Agency & Middle-Range Theories

It is important to emphasize that recent studies of migration have not focused on creating a single theory. Many scholars have found this type of endeavor to be useless and instead attempted to understand the various confusions, paradoxes, and unwanted outcomes of migration (Castles, 2007; Portes, 1997). Scholars who have defended this development have generally tended to accept the middle-range approach, which found its roots in Merton’s middle-range theories; which fit well when only limited data are available, as is the case with migration. Castles described the middle-range theory of contemporary migration as the “analysis of a particular migration system linking specific countries of origin, transit, and destination, within the context of the wider social relations of globalization and social transformation. This could lead to theoretical frameworks incorporating both structure and
agency” (2007, p. 365). Structures refer to social institutions within different scopes: macro-level (i.e., states), micro-level (i.e., households), and meso-level (i.e., networks among micro- and macro-levels) institutions. Agency includes individual and collective decisions made to deal with problems of transition (Castles, 2007).

Following Castles’ call, some scholars have tried to put mid-range migration theories into practice. The special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, “Theories of Migration and Social Change,” published in 2010 was an important step in the development of migration theory. In that issue, scholars examined migration-related topics as a part of mainstream sociological studies. This approach not only provided a link between migration and issues of interest to mainstream sociology such as gender, class, and ethnicity within the context of social change and transformation, it also supported development within the field by taking account the tension of structures and agency in the migration process (van Hear, 2010). In that special issue, Helma Lutz examined gender in the migration process and provided possible explanations for the invisibility of women in the theorization of migration. She proposes a gendered model in each scale (macro, meso, and micro level) and takes masculinities and femininities of origin and destination countries into account for the evaluation of gendered migration process (2010).

This themed issue of migration endorsed a more comprehensive approach to migration studies. The mostly agreed-upon characteristics of the new process included connections among internal-international migration, micro-meso-macro-levels, linkages with mainstream sociology topics like gender and ethnicity, and the relationship between structure and agency (van Hear, 2010).

Donato and her collaborators criticize past gender and migration studies for their male-centered approach. They argue that “future breakthroughs from gender analysis will be the product of heightened collaboration across disciplines and innovative ways of combining quantitative and qualitative methods that understand gender to be relational and contextual, power-laden and also dynamic” (Donato et al., 2006, p.13).

2.6. Summary of Theoretical Discussions and Possible Future Directions

Although migration is not a new phenomenon, the sociological interest in the field of migration is fairly new and linked to recent increases in internal and international migration, especially that which has occurred in the last few decades. Borrowing from and incorporating micro- and macro-level theories, scholars have attempted to resolve the question of why some people move while some do not, even when in the same conditions. Another enduring question concerns why human movement continues and how it might be stopped. Though push-pull and neoclassical theories explain certain characteristics of such flows (mainly those of labor-based migrants), there is no comprehensive approach to answering these questions and gender has not been involved in the developments of classical theories. Thus, existing theories have been criticized for revolving around international labor markets, disregarding other types of migration and migrants, lacking gender in the migratory process, and for their male-dominated perspectives.
Massey and colleagues attempted to “integrate” existing theories of international migration (1993, p. 432), asserting that their study showed “what an integrated theory of international migration should look like” (Massey et al., 1998, p. 281). Although many scholars have found this research to provide a useful summary of leading sociological thought on migration, and especially applauded the work’s contribution to networks theory, some researchers have criticized the piece due to its missing a number of approaches and critical points. The primary critiques are related to their selective method (i.e., choosing a set of favorite fragmented theories, to the neglect of others), while simultaneously asserting that their work was “integrated.” This selectivity can be seen in a study of Massey and Espinosa a few years later. They claim that the returning reasons of Mexican migrants in the US are more related to the theories of social capital and the new economics of migration than the neoclassical theory (Massey & Espinosa, 1997). Also, the study disregards the changing effects of time and space. For instance, forced migration has increased significantly since the time of writing, and internal migrants now outnumber international migrants. The researchers also missed the connections among micro-, meso-, and macro-levels (Bakewell, 2010; Castles, 2007; van Hear, 2010).

Almost two decades after Massey's selective, poorly “integrated,” and time-biased study (van Hear, 2010), pioneers such as Castles and Portes pursued another approach to further develop migration theory. These scholars avoided using restrictive dichotomies to classify migration topics, instead of supporting the galvanization of related approaches in the field. They also attempted to locate the phenomenon of migration within mainstream theories of social change, inside the contexts of structure and agency. Scholars have found that this approach provides a useful starting point for progress in the field. Both studies and the subsequent discussion have contributed to the theoretical development of migration studies and created a new understanding of the topic. For example, following the analysis of the importance of time and space in migration studies, Fussell argued for “three dimensions of migration theories: a spatial dimension bridging the origin and destination countries, a temporal dimension explaining why a migration stream begins and continues to grow or does not, and a volitional dimension revealing the responses of migrants to the contexts that produce and change the migration stream” (2012, p. 26).

There is an increasing academic interest in gender and migration studies, and frequent attempts have been made to evaluate the topic in accordance with the critiques mentioned above. However, work in this area continues to neglect certain migrant groups such as refugees and asylees and does not focus on internal studies and their linkages to international migration (with a few exceptions, such as King & Skeldon, 2010). Castles’ (2003, 2007, 2010) comprehensive approach to examining the topic of migration covers a great deal but tends to be frenetic. The results may suffer due to time, space, and other essential factors such as technology, which could eventually provide a better alternative to Castles’ social change; as stated above, a number of scholars have found this approach to be time-biased. I argue that the field of gender and migration can progress with new data, especially in the lesser-known fields of forced and internal migration, by providing connections among new studies and earlier literature.
and evaluating gender in the development of the theory. Also, dualistic, comparative, interdisciplinary, and multi-level analyses that include other parts of the world will generate new developments in the field.

3. Part II: Gender in Major Causes of Global Migration

Sociological interest in migration question mainly focuses on (voluntary) labor international migration of males and the possible related causes. Therefore, work in this area tends to neglect internal migration, involuntary migrants, and the role of gender; there are only a few exceptions, such as King and Skeldon’s study about interconnection between internal and international migration (2010), van Hear’s study of forced migrants (1998), and Lutz’s work on gender in migration process (2010). As such, attempts to understand the causes of migration generally do not focus on major problems related to other forms of migration and their links to the labor-based movement (Castles, 2003). As Anderson summarized, “migration policies fail because they are about migration” (2017, p. 1528). He stresses the complexity of migration and its relations to global issues. It seems that there is an increasing agreement among sociologists with regards to the importance of less-examined areas related to the topic (e.g., gender) and the necessity of incorporating these neglected segments (e.g., global inequality) as integral parts of mainstream sociology (Castles, 2013; van Hear, 2010). However, studies that do this are currently very few in number. Castles’ work is a notable exception that focuses exclusively on the major causes of international migration (2013). He presents the paradoxes emerging from the topic of migration and a reduced interest in its major causes, as well as its relationship to national dynamics. The more recent exception is the study of (Khiabany, 2016). He summarizes the reasons for migration as “They (refugees) are here because ‘we’ are there” (2016, p. 760). However, I argue that this approach covers only one side of the same coin and does not cover vicious under development cycles and corrupt political leaders of the developing countries.

Castles summarizes the key drivers and their main links with migration under the titles of inequality, neoliberal globalization and social transformation, state and human security, technology, labor demand, demographic change, politics, law and governance, the social dynamics, and the migration industry. He stresses the importance of gender in two drivers of international migration, inequality, and politics. According to him, national migration rules separate people based on gender and other differences. So, he argues that international migration is the outcome of this inequality (2013, p. 127). Also, Castles explains that gender is one of the variables in the stratification of the global labor market. It helps to understand why some people have unlimited mobility, while others controlled or excluded (2013).

Immigrants may create and add new inequalities in both sending and receiving societies, and along with different scales. Some problems with inequality can be nearly invisible, due to standard procedures in the governing bureaucracy (Blommaert, 2001), “inequality regimes” in the labor market (Acker, 2006), and language-related obstacles (Fuller & Vosko, 2008). Some inequalities may lessen or disappear over time, but most normalization does not come quickly. The decisions of receiving societies with regards to normalization, a sense of sharing, and the general acceptance of
newcomers may require experiences with and feedback from immigrants, and rich history with migration.

Research has shown the importance of history and considering a variety of experiences, such as with issues like gender, racial order, and the color line (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Fox & Guglielmo, 2012; Lee & Bean, 2007), academic performance (Hillmert, 2013), definitions of “us” versus “them,” and a sense of nationalism in opposition to an historical other (Triandafyllidou, 1998). Studies like that conducted by (Fuller & Vosko, 2008) are lengthy to complete (in that case, 15 years), especially when comparing the labor market effects produced by immigrants’ residency as opposed to the experiences of native-born citizens. The assessment of the immigrants’ integration to the labor market in destination countries requires their long-time skills such as overcoming language barriers and other problems. Fuller and Vosko’s study stresses this point and “highlights the salience of gender relations in shaping workers’ experiences of insecurity in different types of temporary employment” (2008, p. 31). Therefore, examining existing inequalities (i.e., those tied to gender, race, and immigration status) within and between nations at different levels and in a variety of places, as well as their association to emerging inequalities, could be useful to understanding the causes of migration and the role of immigrants in social change and transformation.

3.1. Understanding Gender in Existing Inequalities of International Migration

Castles argues that “Migration control is really about regulating North-South relationships and maintaining inequality. Only when the central objective shifts to one of reducing inequality will migration control become both successful and – eventually – superfluous” (2004, p. 224). There have been several essential attempts at both the national and international levels to regulate migration and incorporate patterns of global inequality. However, they mostly have failed. Thus, we first need to show the structures that produce this inequality in international and national institutions and the role of gender in existing inequalities.

The early international migration studies have neglected the role of women in the labor market of destination countries and their participation in the household decision-making process of migration. Thus, the role of gender is described with a male bias of research. According to these studies, men migrate for labor, and women join them later as dependents. However, Kofman provides the three different stages of gender breakdown to the labor market in destination countries, women’s participation in migration decision-making, and women’s autonomous migration with the examples from Europe. She claims that many academics do not examine gender in migration studies due not the lack of data, “but rather to resistance to acknowledging autonomous female migration” (Kofman, 1999, p. 274). So, it is possible to find some evidence for gender division in the existing inequalities of migration by scrutinizing literature.

In recent decades, global inequality has reached its highest level in history (Castles, 2013). International organizations have emerged as institutions of equal representation of states. However, their role in lessening inequality has been exaggerated because Western countries have, over time, become increasingly involved with inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations.
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(INGOs); developed countries are especially powerful when acting through INGOs. The role of international non-governmental organizations in leading state policies on important topics like education, science, and war is impossible to ignore. Western states lead to the world in political power, feeding cultural conflicts. Also, some developing countries continue to select dictators who create new tensions. The active membership of developed countries in international organizations allows them to take a primary role in global and national polities (Beckfield, 2003). Thus, while developed countries continue to prevail in INGOs, the ability of INGO policies to actually lessen inequality is debatable. Also, employment in international organizations are still at low levels, though it is increasing. The women employment in the United Nations increased by 27.7% in 2000 to 36.8% in 2010, while the European Commission passed from employing 21.1% of women in 2000 to 29.5% in 2010. However, almost three out of four women employment is at the non-management or middle-management positions (ISPI, 2012). Thus, women stay underrepresented positions in these organizations looking for equality.

Although economic migration studies have increased in number, we continue to know little about how migration and immigrants affect income distribution in terms of both sending and receiving societies and on national and global scales. Existing theories have not fully addressed the issue. Goesling (2001) underscored the incomplete evaluation of global income inequality as derived from current sociological theories such as that of world systems since such theories address only a single aspect within or between nations. However, the world’s income inequality is the sum of all inequalities (i.e., gender, race) within and between countries.

Discussions of income inequality have focused on the boom in migration despite globalization, as well as other factors. Trade between the developed and developing worlds affects average pay levels, negatively impacting less-skilled jobs in developed countries. Also, high profile, educated, and skilled immigrants have the potential to exacerbate inequality because they increase job competitiveness, especially with regards to highly skilled jobs. While some studies have considered the economic consequences of immigration, sociology has not paid sufficient attention to the topic (Alderson & Nielsen, 2002). However, there is a growing sociological interest to the issue in the last decade.

Inequality studies misinterpret the topics, such as the differences between temporary and full-time jobs available on the labor market. Internal and external dynamics have changed over time. For example, full-time employment is declining while temporary employment is increasing; temporary workers earn less money than their full-time counterparts, and new immigrants’ participation in the labor market is less than that of other groups. Also, language barriers and other obstacles cause late labor market integration for immigrants and can result in the production of new inequalities. (Fuller & Vosko, 2008). Fuller and Vosko examine how gender and immigration status affect temporary employment. They found that gender-based inequality is not uniform and varies by type of employment. For example, the public sector provides more equal opportunities than the private sector for women (2008). Thus, the internal dynamics of the labor market and their links to gender and migration should be further evaluated to obtain a better understanding of economic inequalities. Also, it is important to examine
the labor market as a producer of inequality, because even in the US, local and regional decisions related to the labor market are completely different (Acker, 2006).

Another neglected field related to the evaluation of immigrants’ gender inequality is their emotion-based decisions. Svasek (2010) summarized possible answers to questions about the relationship between immigrants’ economic disparities and their emotional decisions. This study showed that the profound need that motivates forced migration is regularly denied or misconstrued because of expert codes that support passionate separation and prevent the offering of proper preparation programs. Inequality is perpetuated when forced immigrants first meet with authorities. The desire of Western countries to decrease the number of immigrants is demonstrated by the legal integration process. Ehrenreich and Hochschild have analyzed the emotional costs of labor migration in terms of gender and other differences. They show that global inequalities are not the only reason for women labor migration. Gender and generational inequalities in the division of care work both in sending households and in receiving households also play a large part in shaping the causes and consequences of women labor migration (Raghuram, 2004).

3.2. Racial and Ethnic Inequalities

Migrants’ social structures take an intermediary role between state policies and the migrants themselves. However, developed countries dominate the related organizations, affect this relationship, and turn it in favor of receiving countries (Beckfield, 2003). Immigrants’ limited language capabilities and Western countries’ standardized process of immigration (i.e., forms, documents) that is used to decide key issues of immigrants’ lives may serve to obscure their actual experiences. The decisions they make are affected by assumptions formed by the authorities about “sharedeness” (Blommaert, 2001, p. 445).

Moreover, inequality can vary over time. The color line was different in the past for groups like Italians, the Irish, and Jews in the US. They have not accepted as whites and discriminated. After 9/11, Muslims and Middle Easterners are facing the same inequalities and discrimination (Acker, 2006). Scholars have argued that the racial order is changing, but alternative suggestions still categorize Whites at the top and Blacks at the bottom. Key differences emerge between former and new immigrant groups. At the individual level, these differences are mostly related to gender, education, skin color, relative power, and other issues. Though some groups, such as Asians and Eastern Europeans, have experienced race-related problems, they seem now to be completely naturalized. However, Blacks remain in a problematic position, even though they have a deeper history than their counterparts of different colors. The civil rights era changed, and in some ways, normalized some discriminatory situations in American society. Blacks remain a long-suffering group. Latinos seem to be better off than Blacks in terms of their journey across the US’s racial borders (Bonilla-silva, 2004). Affirmative action lessens the effects of elite networks and provides an opportunity for minorities and immigrants of different origins. However, “advantage is hard to give up” (Acker, 2006, p. 455). The structures (i.e., nations) of different scales (i.e., micro- and macro-levels) tend to preserve their power and privilege. It is difficult to abandon the opportunity for the sake of equality and universal good.
Another obstacle to understanding equality is related to male bias in evaluating existing gender data (Kofman, 1999) and the limited comparative data and methods available in the field. Goesling summarized the methods and data available to inequality studies, finding that most scholars used mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) and/or Theil’s index method (1967), and the data were derived mostly based on regression estimates from nations’ income statistics (2001). However, these data are problematic and based on estimations made in previous studies. Recent data seem more reliable. Estimates of average national incomes and national population sizes can be obtained from the World Bank. Another promising dataset is the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), which helps to overcome the limitations of previous datasets and provides an extensive comparative study that includes information from more than 150 countries collected since the 1960s (Solt, 2009). These new developments and adding the role of gender to migration studies will contribute to more reliable comparative studies in the field.

4. Part III: Gender and Integration

The experiences of international migrants are shaped by factors such as gender, race, age, and class. Gender has a deep impact on the unequal migration experiences of migrants and their incorporation process to destination countries. Thus, it is important to evaluate the experiences of gender groups in each dimension of integration.

4.1. Dimensions (Domains) of Integration

In the last century, almost all migrations have been from underdeveloped to developed countries. Such industrial states have political and economic supremacy, and therefore are able to include people of lower socioeconomic levels in their society. Castles (2004) described these industrial societies as politically and culturally framed by nation-states. Generally, their principal aim is to increase national welfare. Western nation-states are contradictory, “with growing productivity and wealth on the one hand, but social misery and class conflict on the other” (Castles, 2004, p. 355). Immigrants and their cultures, values, and norms are considered harmful and seen as a threat to the communities they join. Therefore, they are put through a series of acculturation processes to adapt them to the host society’s values (Castles, 2004). Menjivar supports this idea by showing the continuing centrality of nation-states in immigrants’ lives (2006). Most research on this topic is based on this hypothesis, as expressed in the literature of integration.

Therefore, attitudes toward and strategies of acculturation (i.e., assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization) are central issues dominating nearly all of the research on this topic. Given immigrants’ cultural maintenance and contact with the host community, Rohman and colleagues defined acculturation attitudes as follows: “integration: desire for culture maintenance and desire for contact with host society; assimilation: no desire for culture maintenance but desire for contact; separation: desire for culture maintenance but no desire for contact; marginalization: no desire for culture maintenance and no desire for contact” (Rohmann et al., 2006, p. 684). Although integration and assimilation are different in terms of both meaning and concept, they have regularly been used interchangeably. Depending on the types of acculturation strategies employed, immigrants tend to prefer integration rather
than assimilation. However, members of the host country often demonstrate less favorable attitudes toward multiculturalism and generally prefer assimilation (Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, & Sidanius, 2010).

Part 1 suggested that there was no single, comprehensive, generally accepted theory of immigration studies and gender issues have been neglected in the theorization of migration. However, certain dimensions and approaches have been put forth, such as: (1) initiation and perpetuation, (2) micro- and macro-perspectives (3) push-pull, etc. Also, some studies which incorporate gender into the theorization of migration have shown there. Ager and Strang presented another multidimensional, comprehensive approach to immigrant integration, according to the following framework: (1) means and markers (i.e., employment, education, housing, and health); (2) social connections (i.e., social bonds, bridges, and links); (3) facilitators (i.e., language, cultural knowledge, and safety); and (4) foundation and citizenship (Ager & Strang, 2008).

Some scholars stress the importance of ‘time’ in these dimensions. According to them, duration of immigrants’ residency can positively affect the social integration, and migrants’ homeland education, where they come from, movement motivation may more effective at first entry to receiving country then disappear over time (Martinovic, van Tubergen, & Maas, 2009). I add two more emerging concepts, identity and religion to cover whole recent literature about the dimensions of integration. Also, I evaluate the experiences of different gender groups in each domain of integration to include the migrants’ incorporation process fully.

### 4.2. Means and Markers

These are seen as the public arena of integration. State policies and academic research frequently focus on these areas.

#### 4.2.1. Employment

Given the immigrant integration process, employment has historically been one of the most researched issues (Ballarino & Panichella, 2018; Cheung & Phillimore, 2014). Labor market integration, underemployment, the ideal number and selection of migrants, economic performance, employment conditions, and public belief about immigrants and their employment process have all been discussed extensively (Fussell, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Janus, 2010; Menjivar & Abrego, 2012). However, little attention has been given to the employment experiences of people with different gender identities. One possible reason for this is the lack of disaggregated migration data based on gender. There is a growing interest on sex-disaggregated data, especially in the last decade. The migration institutions under the United Nations and European Union have been collected more migration data based on sex and age. These data allow for the analysis of inequalities and employment experiences of women and
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Men. However, gender is more than women — more data needed to understand the unequal experiences of each gender group and practice appropriate policies for their vulnerabilities.

Employment is a key basic element of integration and has a positive effect on the other sectors and the overall process. Economists generally accept the positive role of immigration on American economic development. However, migrants’ impact on low skilled job market competition is more controversial, and there are different findings according to time and space (Waters, Kasinitz, & Asad, 2014). In general, the studies have found the positive effects of labor migrants, especially in the US context. Yet there are certain barriers that migrants often encounter in the labor market. Also, the characteristics (i.e., market conditions, work conditions, wage conditions) of destination countries in the economy can cause different experiences for each gender group. For example, many immigrant women in receiving societies are seen as dependents and often admitted to temporary pink-collar jobs. Immigrants – including highly skilled and qualified migrants – tend to be employed in lower-paying jobs that do not equate to their knowledge and skill. Barriers and under-employment can undermine refugees’ relationship with their host society, and negatively influence integration (Xypolytas, 2018). Gender groups other than men are more vulnerable to experience inequality in labor markets of destination countries.

4.2.2. Highly-educated migrants, labor market, and gender

The literature shows that highly-educated immigrants/refugees’ participation in the labor market is at deficient levels, especially in Europe. However, a few studies oppose this by claiming that the number of highly skilled migrants are growing since the 1990s in the US (Lowell, 2010). Most frequently provided reasons for high unemployment rates of migrants are the language barrier, different labor market characteristics of the host countries/regions, and human capital. However, the findings of most literature are disputable and limited since they frequently compare two or three countries and do not evaluate the changing factors among host institutions (Kogan, 2006). In the American context, highly educated immigrants (that is mainly, Asians) seem similar to their native counterparts since their participation to labor market follows the same path (i.e., graduate school to the job market) as natives. The professional immigrants educated abroad transit job market after accomplishing required experience and language ability (R. Alba & Nee, 1997). Recent studies argue ongoing problems such as the obstacle to participating specific skilled jobs (Erel, 2010), segregation towards refugees (Tian, Wang, & Chia, 2018), language domination in particular jobs (Lan, 2011), the disregarding talents/qualifications of highly-skilled immigrants (Tian et al., 2018) even they accomplish required things of the labor market, and gender gap (Donato, Wakabayashi, Hakimzadeh, & Armenta, 2008; Ho & Alcorso, 2004; Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos, 2013; Read & Oselin, 2008; Yuval-Davis, Anthias, & Kofman, 2005). Donato and her collaborators found problematic employment conditions, especially for women, and showed significant gender differences in the US labor market after 1993 (2008). Ho and Alcorso have examined the migrants’ labor market experiences based on their gender in the Australian context. They found evidence of gender effects in job market participation. According to their findings, skilled women’s job market participation
was less than their male counterparts, even at the same visa category (2004). Korteweg and Triadafilopoulos have shown job market gender inequalities in the European context (2013). Another study has found that “highly educated migrant women are twice as likely as highly educated native-born women to be employed in low-skilled jobs, with highly educated third-country migrant women having the highest incidence of de-skilling.” (Rubin, Rendall, Rabinovich, Tsang, Janta, & Oranje-Nassau, 2008, p. 33). All these studies are essential to show the job market’s participation gap between women and men. However, more data needed to evaluate other gender groups’ experiences in the same contexts.

4.2.3. Housing

Migrants generally have lower incomes compared to the averages seen by citizens of their host country. Therefore, living spaces tend to be insufficient and poor (R. D. Alba, Logan, Stults, Marzan, & Zhang, 1999). Although some achieve better conditions over time, most continue to live in adverse situations. Studies have focused primarily on housing conditions (Rebhun, 2009), while the social and cultural impacts of housing have been ignored (Ager & Strang, 2008). Also, neighborhoods (Trevizo & Lopez, 2016), spatial assimilation (Argeros, 2013; McAvay & Safi, 2018), and residential segregation (Dill, Jirjahn, & Tsertsvadze, 2015) are among the topics discussed by scholars and policymakers. Significantly, such studies have found that immigrants tend to live in groups (i.e., according to ethnicity, race, religion, etc.), separate from their host society (R. D. Alba et al., 1999). However, residential places of refugees are more diverse than labor migrants since their settlement has been decided by the US authorities (R. Alba & Nee, 1997). Also, historical destinations of immigrants (that is mainly, Mexicans) are changing, and they are dispersing to new places (Marrow, 2009).

4.2.4. Education

School participation and educational attainment are basic indicators of successful integration and immigrants’ relationship with the host people. The education system and policies (Teltemann & Schunck, 2016), school participation (Sassler, 2006), and educational attainment/achievement (Wilkinson, Santoro, & Major, 2017) are oft-reviewed topics in the extant research. Such works have revealed that people with high levels of education are more quickly integrated into and accepted by the host community and labor market (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Adsera and Chiswick found that education is more important for immigrant women in Europe (2007), whereas, Read and Oselin found that education has a weak influence on ethnic migrants, primarily Arab American women’s job market participation (2008).

Countries implement and support a number of educational policies to better integrate migrants into society. These policies may have positive effects on immigrants’ social inclusion (Ham, Yang, & Cha, 2017). For example, Kanaiaupuni found that highly educated Mexican women are more vulnerable to migrate to the US (2000). However, migrants face certain obstacles that have negative impacts. Learning the local language and discrimination by fellow schoolmates are foremost (Ager & Strang, 2008). In addition, the right to education in their language and flexible education curricula are often unobtainable or restricted.
4.2.5. Health

Both the conditions and social aspects of immigrants’ health have been examined; topics addressed include health outcomes, physical health, mental health, and health assimilation (Kraeh, Froese, & Kim, 2016; Mood, Jonsson, & Laftman, 2016). Host states prefer healthy individuals when considering admission. Health risks and disease are potential threats to the welfare population. However, migrants are often able to access the necessary health services provided by state agencies, and thus cannot benefit sufficiently from mainstream healthcare (Ager & Strang, 2008). Women are more vulnerable to face health problems in both transit and destination countries (UNFPA, 2018).

While tolerant behaviors and a desire for inclusion increase immigrants’ connection with members of the host country, discrimination leads to psychological distress and segregation (Noor & Shaker, 2017). Though four core domains (i.e., employment, education, health, and housing) have been discussed heavily by scholars and policymakers, there currently exists no comprehensive method for classifying, measuring, and comparing immigration policies, nor is there a common method for categorizing and gauging integration policies (Beine et al., 2016, p. 828). This is one of the fundamental gaps of means and markers.

4.3. Social Connection

“Social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993, p.2). Social capital theory has brought a new dimension to integration studies. Consequently, an increasing number of studies have been conducted that examine the connections among migrants within their communities, with members of other communities, and with institutions (Alencar, 2018; Tegegne, 2018). These can be grouped into three main classes: social bonds (i.e., relations within a community); social bridges (i.e., relations with other communities), and social links (i.e., relations with institutions) (Putman, 1993; Woolcook, 1998; Portes, 1998).

Research in this field has generally considered immigrants to be social actors and examined their relationships, social networks, and participation in the host community. The bonds, social networks, and levels of participation of stakeholders are the most common integration parameters. Also, these parameters show differences based on gender. Curran and her collaborators argue that “gender relations affect the migration process, in part, because gender influences the information and trust available through migrant social capital, as measured by trips and experience and as observed at different levels – household and village” (Curran, Garip, Chung, & Tangchonlatip, 2005, p. 227). Moreover, family networks are more important for women’s migration than men’s move (Kanaiaupuni, 2000). Social bonds (i.e., family, ethnicity, and religion) have various benefits (e.g., providing employment, housing, feelings of safety, etc.) and promote successful integration (Cheung & Phillimore, 2014). Through activities such as birthday parties, meals, sports, tours, etc., social bridges can be built between migrants and local hosts. However, analyses still reveal strong segregation and polarization (Windzio, 2012). This diversity in studies may be
related to social capital’s “episodic, socially constructed and value-based” characteristic (Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne, & Solomos, 2007).

Also, most of the studies use strong ties such as marriage to understand social integration levels of specific immigrant groups (Kim, 2009; Martinovic et al., 2009). However, weak ties, such as immigrants’ leisure time activities with natives, may be more informative about the social integration transformation of migrants over time (Martinovic et al., 2009).

Most scholars have agreed that social relationships contribute positively to integration. However, studies addressing different migrant groups have concluded that social bridges and social links are often weak and inadequate; in contrast, social bonds were found to be strong. Both immigrants and host members generally prefer close ties with friends from their communities.

4.4. Facilitators

4.4.1. Language and Safety

Language as a facilitator has been considered central for integration and discussed extensively in the literature (Akresh, Massey, & Frank, 2014; Nieuwboer & van’t Rood, 2016). Ager and Strang (2008) argued that the state should remove language and cultural knowledge barriers and provide safety and security in order to facilitate integration.

Language proficiency directly links to and benefits other domains of integration, such as employment, education, social connections, etc. It also broadens one’s social networks (Cheung & Phillimore, 2014) and provides social power in addition to economic opportunities (Nawyn, Gjokaj, Agbenyiga, & Grace, 2012). The importance of language skills for integration can vary based on gender. A study on immigrants in European countries suggests that language proficiency is more crucial for men than women in the integration process. Also, the authors found that migrants’ earnings can be less if their native languages are not the same or close to their destination countries’ languages. This income gap narrow to native people’s earnings approximately after 18 years (Adsera & Chiswick, 2007). “Language assimilation is viewed as an ongoing, cumulative process and proficiency is a necessary but insufficient condition for integration” (Akresh et al., 2014, p. 9). Inability to speak the local language is considered an obstacle to integration and leads to segregation. In addition, it causes mental health problems and social distress.

4.5. Foundation

4.5.1. Rights and Citizenship

The immigrants’ legacy in receiving countries may have a significant effect on each dimension of the integration. Illegal immigrants make less money, work in unsafe jobs, refrain from government institutions, and do not search for health care when they compared with legal counterparts (Menjivar & Abrego, 2012). Also, immigrants have different experiences in terms of citizenship and rights based on their gender. For example, lesbian and gay migrants have difficulties in getting citizenship and rights of residence due to destination countries’ laws in Britain and the Netherlands (Binnie, 1997). Another study found that Mexican immigrant men experienced more privileged arena in practicing their citizenship than their women counterparts (Goldring, 2001). Citizenship is often described as a “membership in a political and geographic community,” and
it includes “legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging” (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 154). However, some scholars see citizenship as an insufficiently theorized contract “between the state and the individual” and criticize migrants’ integration and citizenship earning process (Soysal, 2012). Ideally, citizenship brings equal rights to immigrants before the law, but it requires “nationality acquisition” (Koopmans, 2010, p. 3). Koopmans and his collaborators classify the domains of citizenship as cultural acculturation, granting religious practice in public, other cultural rights (free religious attire, public broadcast), political rights, and positive discrimination in the job market (cited in Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M. and Passy, F., 2005). However, literature shows that western countries, especially Europe, are not ready to allow religious rights to naturalized migrants (Koopmans, 2013). Also, the literature focuses on elements of naturalization in political integration and neglects voting and other active political participation to civic life (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 2001). The rates of migrants’ citizenship are decreasing due to its relationship with the rights “rather than state membership” (Bloemraad, 2006, p. 672). The role of US authorities appears only at the first entry, and legally documentation, the rest of the process is related to the personal choices. Unrecognized refugees (asylum seekers) cannot get most of the official grants (Bloemraad, 2006). Also, public support towards the rights of unrecognized refugees seems negative due to fairness perception that labor migrants misuse refugee rights by claiming asylum (Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007).

On the other hand, undocumented immigrants’ legal status affect their integration process to receiving country negatively and not surprisingly increase their origin states relationships (Menjivar, 2006). Although Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) struggle for the rights of immigrants (Bloemraad, 2006), studies show the NGOs’ efforts to help refugees to get social rights are very limited (Nawyn, 2011) and the studies do not cover migration agencies. So, we know less about the feelings, ways, and solutions of migrants against the receiving authorities’ policies (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Also, the academic debate needs a human rights perspective to cover the missing points in the migrants’ integration process (Menjivar & Abrego, 2012). Below, I add two more important concepts to Ager’s (2008) classification that has been reviewed often in the literature: identity and religion.

4.5.2. Identity

Immigrants’ identities, and particularly their gender, religion, ethnicity, race, age, generation, and social-economic status, have all been heavily discussed (Brown & Brown, 2017; Czymara & Schmidt-Catran, 2017). Also, some studies stress the diversity of immigrants when compared with the past (Donato & Armenta, 2011; Koopmans, 2013). Moreover, new findings show that the period of the migration flows effect immigrants’ identity formation (Jimenez, 2008). Researchers have attributed to immigrants/refugees a common identity and not considered them individual human beings (Grzymala-Kazlowska, 2016, p. 1124). The concept of integration does not adequately encompass issues of psychosocial adaptation, such as identity and a need for stability, though identity has become a crucial category for both theoretical considerations and sociological research due to its significance
to understanding individuals and society as a whole (Jenkins, 2004).

A common approach is to assess the impacts and consequences of policies applied to a particular group in a given host country. There are two main forms of integration policy: (1) pluralistic, multicultural, inclusionary, and tolerant; and (2) rigid, exclusionary, and discriminatory. A common finding is that sufficient success has not been achieved; displaced people are not fully able to participate in their host societies and instead tend to be isolated in their neighborhoods.

4.5.3. Religion

Religion has examined from different perspectives in literature. The immigrants’ religions labeled “as a threat to social cohesion” (Castles, 2007, p. 356), have seen problematic especially in West European context (Foner & Alba, 2008), seen as an influencer of the incorporation time (Portes & Borocz, 1989), and the strengthener of the nationalistic character (Triandafyllidou, 1998) with other traits of language and culture in early acculturation contexts in western societies. In recent studies, religion appears as one of the main identifier of immigrants (R. Alba, 2005; Bloemraad et al., 2008) and mostly seen as a main issue/problem especially in European context (Foner & Alba, 2008; Freeman, 2004) in contrast to American context (Hirschman, 2004). Also, some European countries’ migration policies based on gender and religion have created discrimination against ethnic minority women, in particular, Muslim women by forcing to abandon their religious practices (Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos, 2013). Recent studies stress the hostility against Islam in the integration process (McLaren & Johnson, 2007). It seems Muslims’ racialization appears as a hot topic in integration discussions now, similar to Catholic and Jewish displaced persons of the past. Also, the studies neglect variation between migrants’ origin Islamic states and the religious transformation over time (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012).

5. Part IV: Conclusion

Individuals have always moved to develop their living and to be safer throughout history. Migration has seen as an important part of production and development (Castles, 2013; Ibrahim, 2005). Migrants have diverse effects on sending, transit, and receiving countries. So, the reasons and consequences lay behind the migration, and the mobility of migrants are topics of interest of broader sciences (i.e., sociology, law, economy), institutions (local, regional, global), and the public.

Migration is not an old subfield for sociology, which has developed partially in specific types such as international and economic migration for men (Castles, 2003). Other conditions, types of migration (i.e., internal migration, forced migration, climate migration), and the different experiences of other gender groups have been constantly ignored. Theoretical studies heavily discussed the lacks of old immigration theories, which have borrowed from other disciplines (that is, mainly economy) in the field. Massey and his collaborators have presented and summarized some of these theories as an integrative approach (1993). The most accepted contribution of sociology has been the migration networks in the selected theories of Massey and his colleagues (Castles, 2010). However, Massey et al.’s study has been criticized for disregarding some essential elements (i.e., time, space, meso level) to understand the migratory process and not including other
types of migrants (Bakewell, 2010; Castles, 2007; van Hear, 2010). Following Massey et al.’s study, recent studies have a consensus on the covering missing parts of the migration field. Most of the scholars share the idea of a need for developing the migration topic in mainstream sociology topics such as gender, race (Ibrahim, 2005), inequality, and social transformation (van Hear, 2010). However, there are still very limited comparative, inter-disciplinary, or connecting studies in the neglected areas of the field (Adamson, Triadafilopoulos, & Zolberg, 2011; Castles, 2003) with a few exceptions such as the Ayers’ and collaborators’ study which defines immigration as an integral part of race issues (Ayers, Hofstetter, Schnakenberg, & Kolody, 2009). Besides data, measurement, and interpretational problems in the field (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Solt, 2009), the roles of global issues, politics, and media make the understanding and development of the area highly complicated.

An important point while examining the dimensions of integration is the method and data used in these studies. Most of the scholars such as (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, & Haller, 2009) have frequently used the longitudinal analysis to examine the integration processes of the different generations, but multi-disciplinary (especially historical, political, and economic) perspectives and comparative large data samples are still required for the development of integration studies. Also, sex-disaggregated data can be found today, and it helps to understand the different experiences of women and men. However, more data needed to understand the unequal experiences of each gender group and practice appropriate policies for their vulnerabilities.

Although migration is a human movement, the scholarship constantly ignored the centrality of human in the topic (Aydiner, 2018). Migration has labeled as a “security problem” (Gilbert, 2009), instead of production, development, and embedded element of global transformation (Castles, 2013: Ibrahim, 2005). The development of the field requires overcoming the vicious cycles of politics, partially representation of the objects, poor science approach, and usage of inappropriate data and measurement. New studies may develop middle-range theories in appropriate with time and space to create a better understanding and solutions in the migratory process linked to social change as a whole (Castles, 2010).

The main question of this research paper was meant to address is the interconnectedness of migration topic with broader mainstream issues (i.e., gender) at multi-levels. Will the sociology of migration develop by overcoming the continuing problems? Although there has been an increasing agreement related to the necessity of covering the missing parts of the migration science, the embeddedness of the topic to global issues and politics would continue to affect the development of the field. However, seeking independent and inter-disciplinary research bodies to examine the whole migration process for each gender groups may be more productive for the development of the migration studies.
Bibliography


The Implications of Gender on International Migration


The social realities behind the discourse of “Radicalization”

Ömer Faruk Sazak*

Abstract

Beyond abstract or conceptual aspects, “counter-radicalisation” in practitioners’ use refers to a contextual action plan with relevant online and offline components deemed necessary to prevent radicalisation. Nearly every country conducts tailored counter-radicalisation programs that contain more or less similar pre-emptive or preventive steps and those may take different names such as “disengagement”, “deradicalisation” or “prevention”. This article aims to take a look from above over those different tailored programs to find answer to the question of “What is radicalisation?” Interestingly, although forming a departure point for any effort to counter this phenomenon, extant examples exhibit ambiguity on its definition. The ill-defined term does not merit to attain a commonly accepted definition by the academics and policymakers either. The study shows discourse to define this term change across different contexts, and in rare cases where there is similarity what is meant in definition changes across different societies and cultures.

1. “Radicalisation” from Earliest Uses Until Recently

According to Frances Henry and Carol Tator: “Discourse is the way in which language is used socially to convey broad historical meanings. It is language identified by the social conditions of its use, by who is using it and under what conditions. Language can never be ‘neutral' because it bridges our personal and social worlds”(Henry & Tator, 2002). Against this backdrop, it would be more appropriate to approach the term in historical perspective focusing on its development and changes to what it refers to in the course of time.

We come across the word “radical”, for the very first time, at the end of 14th century in the Oxford English Dictionary. Accordingly, it is defined as “Of, belonging to, or from a root or roots; fundamental to or inherent in the natural processes of life, vital; spec. Designating the humour or moisture once thought to be present in all living organisms as a necessary condition of their vitality” (“Oxford English Dictionary,” 2013).

From this definition it is understood that the term was used in the fields of biology or chemistry to define the things necessary for living things to continue livelihood. We do not know the reason why the society or the academics accepted and used this term in these fields. However, this information holds limited importance as the meaning attached to the word may not be related with the events’ or phenomena’s essence or origins, but can be a result of social conventions (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).

According to the Saussure, a pioneering structuralist linguist, the sign consisting of two sides which are form and content, and the relation between two are arbitrary (Saussure, Baskin, Meisel, & Saussy, 2011). In other

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words, there is no inheritance in the meaning of the sign, but there is a strong relationship between the different signs which reminds each other. Maybe this approach can explain the next meaning of radicalisation.

Between the 14th and 18th centuries, we see that radicalisation is used in many different fields such as mathematics, geometry, linguistics, astronomy, medicine and surgery. However, it is not until the end of the 18th century that we observe the term start getting political connotations. In this epoch, it is defined as:

“Advocating thorough or far-reaching political or social reform; representing or supporting an extreme section of a party; spec. (also with capital initial) (a) Brit. belonging to, supporting, or associated with the extreme wing of the Liberal Party which called for a reform of the social and parliamentary system in the late 18th and early 19th cent, (b) U.S. belonging to a faction of the Republican Party seeking extreme action against the South during the Civil War and Reconstruction. Now more generally: revolutionary, esp. left-wing.” (“Oxford English Dictionary,” 2013).

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the term is seen being used to express non-violent reformist activities. (Alex, 2013) Within this context, radicalisation is a kind of transformation leading to liberal thinking which is unusual and different from the mainstream and that excludes violence.

The use of the term initially in the biology and its later introduction to different fields shows that the language network or the structure of the word has changed in the course of time. It has developed different relationships with different words or sounds. The initial connections with “moisture or humidity” in the 14th century shows new connections with different words such as “axis”, “planet”, “tumour”, “change”, “liberal” and “left wing” in the subsequent centuries. This can be said to constitute proof that structuralist approach, which alleges a fixed structure for the language, remains short to explain the changes in the language network of the terms.

We do not know exactly how the term evolved as mentioned above. However, a superficial survey shows those who used the term “radical” in their texts are generally journalists and academics who have no relationship with legal and governmental authorities. Therefore it is conceivable that the discourse to define the radical is not a monologue or a discourse from an upper authority to the subjects. But it is a fruit of natural exchange at lower horizontal levels or nongovernmental bodies or figures, meaning there is no centralised power system behind the process.

Moreover, existence of a variety of perspectives in the evaluation of the term “radical” reminds Bakhtin’s dialogic and intertextuality approach to the discourses (Fairclough, 1992). Accordingly, the prior and other contemporary discourses have some effects on each other. The term “radical” finds increasing number of uses in many different disciplines while in most of them the meaning related to the “root” was preserved. In other words, horizontal and vertical communications between different discourses create new ones. But the the previous ones remain in use as well. It is a result of debate and negotiation rather than an externally imposed discourse from a higher level and of course this transaction will continue as long as opportunity for communication continues.
2. “Radicalisation” Currently in Use

The term radicalisation did not have problematic connotations until 9/11 terror attacks. However, the chain of events from 9/11 to especially 2004 Madrid and the 2005 London terror attacks, triggered academicians and policymakers to propose counter-radicalisation programs to stem the terrorist organizations’ recruiting efforts. In this regard, we see a significant rise in the discussion of radicalisation in the last 20 years.

Bartlett and Miller define the radicalisation as a “process by which the individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views”. (2012) According to Donatella and Gary, the radicalisation is “a process leading towards the increased use of political violence” (2012). Anja Dalgaard Nielsen considers that “radicalisation is understood as a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to the existing order” (2010, p. 798). David Mandel thinks that the radicalisation is a process whereby people become extremists (2009a). Another academician, Peter Neumann defines radicalisation shortly as “What goes on before the bomb goes off”. (2008, p. 4) These are some of the definitions, which show different approaches to the phenomenon, bearing similarities and differences as well.

According to Bartlett and Miller, the phenomenon encourages people to change mainstream beliefs. Then a logically following question would be “what is ‘the mainstream’ belief?”. Because there are no fixed mainstream ideas in this world. Moreover, the mainstream, even existed, would vary across different societies and periods of time.

Donatella and Gary do not mention the belief system, but they do emphasise the relationship between radicalisation and political violence. Then there is need for clarification on what is political violence? Is there any crime genre called political violence or does it have any definition in the legal system? These are just some of the questions that come to mind upon reading the definition.

Dalgaard Nielsen’s approach is different from the others. She also mentions about far-reaching changes in an existing system. However, the existing system varies in different countries. A person who insists on a liberal governmental system will be a radical person in North Korea while this could be an ordinary demand in a western country.

David Mandel establishes a link between radicalisation and extremism. However, extremism is an ill-defined concept as well. This statement raises another question: “What is extremism?”

Peter Neuman thinks that radicalisation is a preparation process before the terrorist bombing event. So he directly puts a link between radicalisation and violence and terrorism.

3. Discussion

Nearly all the academics see the radicalisation as a process which is not controversial. However, there is ambiguity on the connection of radical thoughts and violent actions, and heated discussions continue to exist based on the fact that ideology and action are only sometimes connected. (Borum, 2011)
All these discussions remind the Austin and Wittgenstein approach to the language. Wittgenstein says: “think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws - the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects [. . .] Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially when we are doing philosophy!” (Wittgenstein, 1953).

Wittgenstein sees the language as a toolkit. The words or discourses themselves are very abstract and difficult to understand. They acquire exact meaning with the actions or duties they have to perform. Therefore, there is a correlation between the word and action. If link cannot be established between the discourse and the action, then that discourse becomes problematic and ill-defined to us. The reader is supposed to gain the right meaning after practicing it in the real world because descriptions are not repetitions of words abstracted from practice. In fact, descriptions are themselves practices that are used to perform a range of activities.

The problems in the radicalisation definition suit the explanation of Wittgenstein. The explanations or definitions of the radicalisation does not reflect what we observe in the real world. More precisely, there is no linear conditionality between radicalisation and violence. Therefore, the word and the action does not match. On the contrary, many radicals are observed not to have been involved in any violent action. The contrary is also valid. There are terrorists who do not possess radical thoughts.

John Horgan and Randy Borum, two scholars on radicalisation, posit: “There is no inevitable link between (extremist) political beliefs and (violent) political action, and that the two phenomena should, therefore, be studied separately. There … always be far more radicals than terrorists, but terrorists do not always hold strong political beliefs. Being a cognitive extremist, in other words, is neither sufficient nor necessary as a condition for becoming a terrorist. Many terrorists—even those who lay claim to a “cause”—are not deeply ideological and may not “radicalize” in any traditional sense … Some terrorists— perhaps even many of them—are not ideologues or deep believers in a nuanced, extremist doctrine” (P. R. Neumann, 2013).

At this point, we start to see different terms that aim to clarify radicalisation, reminding the Austin approach to the discourse analyses. For Austin, there are two kinds of discourses, conservative and performative. (Austin, Urmson, & Sbisà, 1975) Radicalisation definitions misfired because the term could not cover felicity conditions of the real situations. Because radicalisation is a process and some part of it need just descriptive definition rather than to be related directly with action.

According to Austin, there are six rules which are essential to have a performative utterance (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001) and it is seen that radicalisation definitions do not suit some of these rules. For example, in the radicalisation process, there is no accepted conventional procedure. We do not know how a normal person becomes radical. This procedure is unclear. Not only radicals but also terrorists do not have identical or even close qualifications. For example, some of them are well educated whereas
some do not possess decent educational background.

Silver and Bhatt allege a profile of terrorists in their research which cover five different groups and terror events. They assert that the terrorists with Muslim background, typically has following characteristics:

» Male,
» Under the age of 35,
» Residents and citizens of Western liberal democracies,
» Varied ethnic backgrounds but often are a second or third generation of their home country,
» Middle-class backgrounds; not economically destitute,
» Educated; at least high school graduates, if not university students,
» Recent converts to Islam are particularly vulnerable,
» Do not begin as radical or even devout Muslims,
» Having ordinary lives and jobs,
» Little, if any, criminal history (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Those characteristics come as result of a comparative case study and as such it is hard to be generalised. Still, within the complementarity of the study there are several bothering points. First of all, the description above is very complicated and it nearly covers most of the Muslims under 35 years old. Second this type of profile belong to terrorists but not to radical persons.

As can be clearly seen in the case study above, despite clear datasets pertaining to real persons committing terrorist acts, the efforts to profile a “terrorist” yield such general results that they have nearly no explication ability. In the question of radicalisation, the situation is much more grim.

In the case of the latter, the profiles of the radical or the procedure for becoming radical is unclear. This lack of sufficient knowledge precludes use of the term “radicalisation” to explain the thoughts and the actions at the same time. Therefore, the scholars started to use different terminology such as “cognitive radicalisation” and “behavioural radicalisation”. From the two derived radicalisation terms, the former is related to the thoughts and the latter to actions.

These two terms can be a good example of Austin’s constative and performative discourses. Cognitive radicalisation is not a performative utterance and just a description of a situation which does not motivate the person for any action. However, how can we understand a cognitive radical form of the person? I mean if a thought or an idea does not show itself with action then how can we categorise it?

Behavioural radicalisation concept is also problematic because it is constituted to define the action which has emerged from a radical thought. However, the type of action has not been defined clearly. I mean what kind of actions can be categorized under the behavioural radicalisation is very uncertain. For example, if someone participates in a demonstration of a protest against the legal authority, can this person be called a behavioural radical? Or does singing a protest song make the person a behavioural radical? We can ask many questions like this, but I think the answers will be very controversial and not satisfactory for most of the people.
3.1. Radicalisation in a Political Discourse

A significant rise in the counter-radicalisation projects has been observed after 9/11, 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terror attacks. European Commission Expert Group Report, which recommended further research projects on counter-radicalisation, encouraged new studies in this subject (Rogelio et al., 2008).

To name few of those projects, the Safire Project is aimed to provide a better understanding of the rationale and the drivers underlying radicalisation processes (TNO, 2015). The Impact Europe Project focused on “counter violent radicalisation (Impact Europa Consortium, 2015). The Prime Project aimed to improve our understanding of lone actor extremist events (PRIME Consortium, 2015). The Religare Project explored how to cope with the increasing religious diversity in a democratic context (Foblets & Alidadi, 2013). The Eurislam Project tried to provide a systematic analysis of the cultural integration of immigrants in general and Muslims in particular (Universitet van Amsterdam, 2014). The Religiovest Project tried to show the public debate on religion (Europan University Institute, 2016). The Myplace Project tried to understand the young people’s attitude and participation in political organisations and social movements in Europe (University of Manchester, 2010). All these projects, which have been funded by European Commission, aimed to understand what really radicalisation is and tried to find a solution to prevent it. However, in this last 20 years, the term became more complicated and highly political.

For a better understanding of its political aspect, the governments’ or policymakers’ approach to radicalisation can be a good start. The British government defined the radicalisation as ‘the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups. (Government, 2009). With this statement, the British government emphasises the connection between radicals, violence and terrorism.

Justice and public security ministry of Norway published government action plan against radicalisation and violent extremism. The plan reads: “Radicalisation is understood here to be a process whereby a person increasingly accepts the use of violence to achieve political, ideological or religious goals (NMJPS, 2014). With this explanation, we see that Norway has established a connection between radicalisation and violence.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark states: “Radicalisation is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism” (Mandel, 2009b). The link between defined radicalisation and terrorism is clear.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Department stated: ‘While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism (RCMP-GRC, 2016). Here it is seen that Royal Canadian Police views radicalisation as a cognitive phenomenon, instead of setting a link between thoughts and behaviours.

All these definitions, determined by security priorities, set a link between radicalisation and violence. What makes these definitions or discourses different from the others is the fact that they have been put together by the
legitimate authority that controls, coordinates and uses the power of the state. This power, acknowledge and discourse triangle reminds the Foucault’s ideas about discourses.

Foucault sees the discourses “as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. ” (Foucault, 1969), He thinks that discourse must be accepted as a social fact because it organizes the knowledge which can structure the society. Here we see the design ability of the discourse. However, the acceptance of the discourse is very important. Otherwise, it will not have a chance to affect the society. At this very point, the power behind the discourse comes into prominence. According to Foucault this power creates the discourse and justify it.

Foucault’s approach to the discourses describes the reason why radicalisation definitions are highly political. The radicalisation definitions belong to the governmental offices or institutions. It is possible to see similar parallels between definitions in all counter-radicalisation programs in the last twenty years. Therefore we can say that the legal power encourages the society to talk on radicalisation with its determined definition, in their everyday life. Thus society has a chance to see, observe and repeat the terminology which contributes to the legalization of the definition.

However, it is seen that the society has not accepted the definition of the radicalisation and the discussion on it is still ongoing because the definition is disconnected from its historical development. It is a brand new definition. However, the rationality underlying its production does not suit the rules or categories which was created by the society (or the power) in the course of time. Because of that reason, there are many interpretations of it.

Media is the other power centre in the society. There is an irrefutable reality that the media has a strong effect on policymakers and the society. It has the role to inform the society about the truth behind events at home or abroad. However, the way of reporting and representing the news is very important because media has a chance to create a perception which might be based on reality or a specific agenda.

The governmental institutions’ discourses can be perceived as an obligation for the society, and actually, this is a right sense because governments use all kinds of the state power to make society adopt the discourses. For example, after defining a new definition of radicalisation, it prepares an action plan to combat against radicalisation, and it can support this action plan with some new laws which are approved by the legal systems. This justification process suits the rules or categories to create a new discourse by legal power. However, it is not a natural process for the society.

From this perspective, media can be said to be one move ahead of governmental authority because it does not force anyone to adopt its discourses. However, the discourse which is produced by the media can easily penetrate the everyday life of the society through newspapers, tv programs and the internet. Therefore the media’s approach to radicalisation is very important for the society and the governments.

There are critiques to the radicalisation discourse of the media. In line with Foucault’s argumentation, the discourses can construct real and perceived surroundings. In this sense radicalisation discourse maintained by media has created a fear atmosphere in the society towards the Muslim minority in the Europe (Meleagrou-Hitchens &
Kaderbhai, 2017). The term radical began to be perceived nearly in the same meaning as “Muslim terrorist”.

This security approach of the media to the term has encouraged the governmental institutions to prepare more strict radicalisation definition. However, the problem is that there is another accepted discourse, which is “terrorism”. The more media and governmental institutions amplified the content of the definition for radicalisation, the more two terms started to be used interchangeably. This further created spiralling of problems adding to the identity crisis of Muslim minorities in Europe and their estrangement to the host societies.

3.2. The Discourse of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

MILIS is a terrorist organization recognized by nearly all countries as well as UN and EU. It adopts the Salafi jihadist ideology as its likes and its announced objectives can be summarised as follows:

- Establish a Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant,
- Control and Govern the Caliphate,
- Expand Islam and Sharia Law Worldwide,

So, the discourse by ISIL is leveled mainly to justify and promote its actions based on decontextualized religious texts and thus acquire legitimacy. Among those texts, Koran, the holy book for Muslims, has a special place as it is believed that the source or the author of the book is no one else then the God. In the case of Koran, a commandment or a sentence is extremely important as it constitutes the boundaries the adherents have to follow.

In the structuralist, poststructuralist or postmodern approach to the discourse, the author or the owner of the discourse lose its importance, because the interaction between discourse and the reader can create the reality. Therefore the reader or the subject is the main essence for the discourse. However, when the author of the discourse is God, then everyone, of course those Muslims, tries to understand the real meaning behind the text or discourses.

Another important aspect is interpretations. According to the theory named after itself, interpretation is the way to fill the gap between what the speaker says and what the others understand from that discourse (McFadden & Ricoeur, 1978). Ricoeur thinks that understanding and explaining is the two complementary things which can happen in interpretation.

ISIL’s interpretation of Koran is different from the mainstream Sunnite belief. ISIL isolates the sentences in Koran from its historical context, or reasons of descent and then makes a judgement or an interpretation by considering only the meaning of the words. Afterwards, ISIL wants from every Muslims to obey their interpretations because this terrorist organization calls itself “Islamic State” and calls its leader a “Caliph”.

“Islamic State” is the figured world which is created by the ISIL. “ A figured world is a picture of a simplified world that captures what is taken to be typical or normal” (Gee, 2014). Of course the “typical and normal” have different meanings in different societies. ISIL had the power to construct the environment
according to its discourses in Iraq and Syria because they were effective in the battlefield and were able to impose control on several cities to include Mosul. ISIL used the state power against the residents where they were in rule and used the religion as a mobilizing factor to get access to others beyond its borders. These two strengths provided ISIL to create a figured world as “Islamic State”.

The discourse maintained can be said to be very successful because according to the UN Security Council, “terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups have attracted over 30,000 foreign fighters from over 100 Member States” (UN, 2015).

4. Conclusion

Based on ISIL example we can say that all radical/extremist/terrorist organizations have their own discourses which affect the targeted societies. They attract sympathy in the society which they want to penetrate through these discourses. The planner and the performers of the counter-radicalisation programs must analyse the discourses of radical organizations very clearly, and then prepare a counter-radicalisation program. Otherwise, the expected outcomes from these programs would be a disappointment for everyone.
The social realities behind the discourse of “Radicalization”

Bibliography


‘When Trees Fall, Monkeys Scatter: Rethinking Democracy in China’ is an important book that tackles a timely and depressing issue of our times, the emergence of new types of regimes. John Keane, the author of the book, is renowned for his imaginative thinking about democracy and its future. One of his most prominent books is ‘The Life and Death of Democracy’ which is the first full-scale history of democracy after a century.

Over the last few decades, new types of regimes have been engulfing the world. These regimes appear to be democratic. Yet, inside these regimes, there are sizable efforts to undermine the very fundamental tenets of democracy, such as freedom of assembly and speech. Keane in this book, explains the complexity of such regimes as follows, ‘Contemporary political trends in China befuddle inherited narratives of authoritarianism and democracy’.

Keane starts with criticising orientalist views on China which claim that China is an authoritarian regime. Then he explains why Chinese regime type cannot be categorized purely as authoritarianism, as many scholars did in the past years.

Following this criticism, he depicts the ways Chinese government sustains its popularity despite many of its undemocratic acts and policies. Regimes such as China, he posits, to some degree keep their democratic aspects like elections to be seen legitimate in the face of both domestic and international audience. He utilizes a new framework to address and understand this “Chinese-made democracy” by offering the concept of “Phantom Democracy”.

‘Phantom Democracy’, to describe briefly, attempts to find an answer to the question of how such regimes sustain or even increase their popularity and legitimacy through wider popular consent. It does so by mapping six major phantom democratic strategies, namely the talk of the people, public opinion polls, public opinion leaders, media storms, the rule of law and elections. ‘Phantom Democracy’ is a system in which the regime creates loyalty in citizens by cultivating the phantasm of democracy, the feeling that they live in a “real” democracy.

The choice of the unorthodox term “phantom” is significant for the argument of the book. Phantom here means something between real and unreal. The author perfectly adapts

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the analogy of a phantom limb for a better understanding. For a person who experienced it, a phantom limb is not simply an imagination. It was for that person a part of his / her reality. Similarly, in a phantom democracy, the citizenry feels like they live in a democracy despite undemocratic changes or manipulations to its very nature and diminishment of its existence.

For Keane, phantom democracies, by nurturing the feeling of democracy and keeping to some degree the fundamental mechanisms like elections and institutions such as the judiciary and media keep fertile the seeds that can support more fuller forms of democracy. This, in many ways, gives us a hope that these regimes might end up developing a robust democracy or as Keane calls it a ‘Monitory Democracy’ where democracy means something beyond free and fair elections.

This concept of ‘Phantom Democracy’ offers us a fresh way of looking at regimes like China, Hungary, and so forth. Given that old concepts such as, ‘Illiberal Democracy’ and ‘Competitive Authoritarianism’, fail to fathom these new emerging regimes, John Keane provides us with a novel way of thinking about the decline of democracy around the world. On the other hand, as Jean-Paul Gagnon delicately puts, Keane starts us off but leaves much wanting. This book is indeed an excellent read for political science students or any other reader who is interested in China or the decline of democracy in general.